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Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis
Abstract
A wealth of literature suggests individuals use feelings in addition to facts as sources of information for
judgment. This paper focuses on a manipulation in which participants list either a few or many examples
of a given type, and then make a judgment. Instead of using the number of arguments or evidence
strength, participants are hypothesized to use the subjective ease of generating examples as the primary
input to judgment. This result is commonly called the ease-of-retrieval effect, and the feeling of ease is
typically assumed to mediate the effect. We use meta-analytic methods across 142 papers, 263 studies,
and 582 effect sizes to assess the robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect, and whether or not the effect
is mediated by subjective ease. On average, the standard few/many manipulation exhibits a mediumsized effect. In experimental conditions designed to replicate the standard effect, about one third to one
half of the total effect is mediated by subjective ease. This supports the standard explanation, but
suggests that other mediators are present. Further, we find evidence of publication bias that reduces the
standard effect by up to one-third. We also find that (1) moderator manipulations that differ from the
standard manipulation lead to smaller, often reversed effects that are not as strongly mediated as ease,
(2) several manipulations of theory-based moderators (e.g., polarized attitudes, misattribution) yield
strong theory-consistent effects, (2) method-based moderators have little or no effects on the results, and
(4) the mediation results are robust with respect to assumptions about error structure.

Disciplines
Applied Behavior Analysis | Behavioral Economics | Business | Cognition and Perception | Cognitive
Psychology | Marketing

This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/382

1

Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis

2
Abstract
A wealth of literature suggests individuals use feelings in addition to facts as sources of
information for judgment. This paper focuses on a manipulation in which participants list either a
few or many examples of a given type, and then make a judgment. Instead of using the number
of arguments or evidence strength, participants are hypothesized to use the subjective ease of
generating examples as the primary input to judgment. This result is commonly called the easeof-retrieval effect, and the feeling of ease is typically assumed to mediate the effect. We use
meta-analytic methods across 142 papers, 263 studies, and 582 effect sizes to assess the
robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect, and whether or not the effect is mediated by subjective
ease. On average, the standard few/many manipulation exhibits a medium-sized effect. In
experimental conditions designed to replicate the standard effect, about one third to one half of
the total effect is mediated by subjective ease. This supports the standard explanation, but
suggests that other mediators are present. Further, we find evidence of publication bias that
reduces the standard effect by up to one-third. We also find that (1) moderator manipulations that
differ from the standard manipulation lead to smaller, often reversed effects that are not as
strongly mediated by ease, (2) several manipulations of theory-based moderators (e.g., polarized
attitudes, misattribution) yield strong theory-consistent effects, (3) method-based moderators
have little or no effects on the results, and (4) the mediation results are robust with respect to
assumptions about error structure.
Public Significance Statement: This quantitative review suggests a medium-sized impact of
feelings of ease of recall on judgment, but it argues feelings of ease alone may not fully explain
classical inductions of feeling-based effects. This review also reports several moderators of when
individuals use their feelings in judgment.
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Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis

A man’s wife asks him, "Do remember the day we first met?" He immediately answers,
"Of course.” She then asks, "What was I wearing?” He replies, "Tight fitting jeans, a black
sweater, black Nike running shoes, and a weirdly huge leather jacket." She smiles. He smiles.
It is not surprising that the wife believes that her husband's excellent memory is evidence
of his love. What is surprising is the conjecture that his quick, easy memory strengthens the
husband's own belief about the depth of his love for his wife. That is, in addition to the facts that
are recalled, the conjecture claims that the experience of remembering, the feeling of ease, is
itself treated as information that can influence our judgments. This conjecture is called the easeof-retrieval effect, and there is a large literature devoted to it. This paper is a meta-analysis of
that large literature and aims to answer the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-retrieval
effect?"
Introduction
Decades of research in psychology and economics have challenged “rational” theories of
human decision-making (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1978). Critically, individuals do not always base their decisions on the
weight of evidence pro and con, but often use other cues and heuristics that are not relevant from
a normative perspective (Albarracin, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005; Bettman et al., 1998; Chaiken,
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). One famous example is the availability heuristic. According to the availability
heuristic, individuals make judgments based on how easy it feels to bring examples to mind
rather than based on the strength of those examples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
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One very general perspective accounts for many of the non-normative findings by
hypothesizing that feelings are often mixed in with facts as decision inputs (Greifeneder, Bless,
& Pham, 2011; Pham, 1998; Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007). These
feelings include both affective feelings (i.e., experiences of moods or emotions, such as
happiness; Pham, 2004) and cognitive feelings (i.e., experiences of mental activities,
metacognition, such as feelings of ease; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz, 2010;
Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For example, the availability heuristic is hypothesized to result from
the use of feelings of ease as an input to judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007).
Cognitive feelings are typically divided into two major forms: processing fluency and
accessibility experiences (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Processing fluency is the subjective ease
with which information is encoded, and accessibility experiences are the feelings of the ease with
which information is retrieved from memory (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz & Clore,
2007). This paper focuses on the specific hypothesis that accessibility experiences are part of a
meta-cognitive process that affects judgment (Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This
meta-cognitive role is very similar to the role of feelings of familiarity in the recognition
memory literature (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Johnston, Dark, &
Jacoby, 1985).
One seminal demonstration of the effects of accessibility experiences is Schwarz et al.
(1991), in which individuals first generated examples of being assertive and then rated their
assertiveness on a multi-item scale. The critical manipulation was whether the experimenters
requested participants to write few (6) or many (12) examples (i.e., a few-versus-many
manipulation). The critical result was that self-rated assertiveness was lower in the "many"
condition than in the “few” condition. Schwarz et al. contended that, although those in the
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“many” condition had more evidence to support high assertiveness than those in the “few”
condition, they rated themselves lower because they inferred low assertiveness from the
difficulty they experienced in the example-generation task. This type of metacognitive inference
has become the standard explanation of the effects of the few-versus-many manipulation and,
therefore, such effects are commonly called ease-of-retrieval effects. Importantly, the ease-ofretrieval effect is the opposite of what is predicted by content numerosity (i.e., people using
number of examples, which they have more of in the “many” condition; Pelham, Smurata, &
Myaskovsky, 1994) and polarization (i.e., attitudes becoming more extreme with more
information; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).
Metacognitive inferences based on subjective ease have also been proposed as
explanations for the effects of the few-versus-many manipulation on judgments about traits,
attitudes, likelihoods, and preferences. For example, this manipulation has been used in studies
of health (by influencing perceived vulnerability; Raghubir & Menon, 1998), consumer
preference (by tilting preference for compromise options; Novemsky et al., 2007), and policy and
political figure attitudes (by affecting support for them; Haddock, 2002; Wänke, Bless, & Biller,
1996). Moreover, this manipulation has been used in experiments examining a wide variety of
tasks, such as product choice (Zhao et al., 2012), cooperation (Müller et al., 2010), and
prediction (Pham, Lee, & Stephen, 2012). One indicator of the influence of both the
manipulation and the ease-of-retrieval explanation is that the original Schwarz et al. (1991) paper
has 577 citations on Web of Science and 1224 on Google Scholar as of July 2017.
Although subjective ease is the dominant explanation, other accounts of the ease-ofretrieval effect have been proposed. First, individuals in the “many” condition might
spontaneously think of more conflicting examples than individuals in the "few" condition, which

6
would yield directionally-similar effects as ease (Tormala et al., 2007; but see Wänke et al.,
1996; Wänke, 2013). Second, Kühnen (2010) proposed that placing the ease question before the
dependent measure in studies creates a demand effects that explains the results. Finally, ease
might increase confidence in what is generated. Subsequently, confidence may then influence
judgments and attitudes (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Tormala et al., 2002). According to these
accounts, subjective ease is not the only or the most immediate mediator of the observed effects.
The existence of these alternative explanations and causal paths increases the desirability
of determining the extent to which subjective ease, by itself, mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect.
If ease does not fully explain the effect (i.e., a mediation analysis reveals a residual direct effect
that is comparable in size to the indirect effect based on subjective ease), then the alternative
explanations are potentially necessary for a full account of the phenomenon.
This paper reports a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and is designed (a) to
test the robustness of the effect, (b) to examine the extent to which subjective ease of retrieval
mediates the effect, (c) to find evidence for or against several theoretical accounts of the effect,
and (d) to determine if methodological factors might account for variation in effect sizes. Our
analyses provide five main results. First, we find a medium effect size estimate for experimental
conditions that were designed to conceptually replicate the original ease-of-retrieval effect,
which we call the standard paradigm. Second, we find that accounting for publication bias could
potentially reduce the standard paradigm’s effect size by approximately a third. Third, we find
support for several theory-based moderators of the effect. Fourth, we find little support for
several potential artifacts that have been proposed in the literature or for methodological
moderators other than publication status. Fifth, we find that subjective ease is a robust partial
mediator for proximal dependent measures in the standard paradigm, but that the direct effect is
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equally robust, suggesting that other mediators are present, even under "ideal" conditions. Also,
reasonable assumptions about heterogeneity, measurement error, and correlated error lead to
smaller estimates of the indirect effect and larger estimates of the direct effect, again suggesting
that other mediators are present.
Theory-Based and Methodological Moderators of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect
One important goal of this meta-analysis is to examine a wide range of theory-based
moderators that have been proposed in the feelings-as-information literature. These moderators
provide potential explanations of heterogeneity in effect sizes. We divide these moderators into
those that potentially inform theories of judgment (e.g., misattribution and involvement) and
those that are mainly exploratory or methodological (e.g., the country in which data were
collected).
It is useful to subdivide theory-based moderators according to how they influence the use
of subjective ease. First, there are moderators that affect the experience of ease or its
accessibility. We call these moderators salience-based. Second, there are moderators that
influence the relationship between the manipulation and the dependent measure by changing
either the weighting of ease as an informational input or the weighting of other non-feeling
inputs in the judgment process. We call these moderators inference-based. The impact of these
two classes of moderators can be seen in Figure 1. By making subjective ease more salient,
salience moderators might change the effect of the manipulation (S1 in Figure 1), or they might
change the effect of subjective ease on the dependent measure by changing the accessibility of
this input (S2). Inference-based moderators might also change the effect of ease on the dependent
measure (I2), not by changing the accessibility of ease, but by changing the implications people
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draw from this cognitive feeling. Additionally, inference-based moderators might trigger some
other non-ease mechanism (I1).
We drew upon a series of reviews within the ease-of-retrieval and feelings-as-information
literatures to identify a set of salience and inference moderators. These reviews included
Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham (2011), Petty et al. (2007), Schwarz (1998, 2004), Schwarz and
Clore (1988, 2007), and Wänke (2013). Our meta-analysis builds on these reviews by
systematically coding the ease-of-retrieval studies in our database in terms of these moderators
and then quantitatively testing the extent to which those moderators are associated with
differences in effect size.
While some moderators apply to the whole study (e.g., type of dependent measure,
publication status), other moderators exist only for some conditions within a study (e.g.,
misattribution used or not; polarized attitude or not). Therefore, for each paper, we split up the
experiment by moderator level into a few-versus-many effect size for each level of the
moderator.
Salience Moderators
Salience moderators are those that affect the retrievability of content or the experience of
ease. These salience moderators should therefore exert an influence through an impact of the
manipulation on experienced ease (S1) or the impact of ease on the dependent measure (S2).
Range. Feelings of subjective ease are likely to become more salient when the retrieval
task is either much easier or much more difficult than usual. As the difference increases between
the number of items required for the “few” and “many” conditions, it is more likely that one or
both will be far from the usual level of retrieval ease. We operationalize this moderator as range
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(i.e., "many" target number - "few" target number). This metric should be positively related to
the size of the effect, as it should affect ease and the downstream impact of the manipulation.
Attention. The salience of cognitive feelings should be enhanced when attention is
explicitly directed toward those feelings. Many ease-of-retrieval experiments include an explicit
measure of feelings of ease. When the feelings of ease are explicitly measured before (rather than
after) the target judgment, attention is drawn to cognitive feelings, which makes them more
salient during the target judgment (Danziger et al., 2005; Kühnen, 2010). This should lead to
larger effect sizes.
Polarized attitude. Individuals with either polarized or crystallized attitudes are less
likely to experience difficulty in generating examples (S1), which should decrease the impact of
the few-versus-many manipulation and thereby decrease effect sizes (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al.,
1999; Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999). However, it is also possible that those with
polarized attitudes make fewer meta-cognitive inference based on ease (I2) or rely on other
information or inferences (I1).
Inference Moderators
These moderators include those manipulations within experiments or differences across
experiments that affect the perceived meaning of feelings of ease (I2) or introduce considerations
of other possible cues to judgment that run contrary to the predictions of ease as an input or
increase the direct effect of the few-versus-many manipulation (I1).
Processing motivation (depth). The first set of moderators concerns processing
motivation, meaning the extent to which an individual is willing to deeply consider the scenario
or judgment in question (Chaiken et al., 1989; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Petty et al.,
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2007; Schwarz, 2004). We distinguish two types of processing motivation: depth and
involvement.
Depth of processing factors found in the ease-of-retrieval literature include accuracy
motivation (i.e., no ease effect for high accuracy motivation; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999),
availability of cognitive processing resources (i.e., ease effects stronger for those under cognitive
constraint; Greifeneder & Bless, 2007), and whether people are in positive or negative moods
(Ruder & Bless, 2003), the latter of which should lead to greater systematic processing (lower
effect sizes; also see Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Consistent with this logic, Ruder and Bless (2003)
find a reversed ease-of-retrieval effect for participants induced to feel sad.
Processing motivation (involvement). The most prominent type of motivation factor in
the ease-of-retrieval literature is whether people engage in low involvement or heuristic (i.e.,
individuals process few pieces of information with less effort) versus high involvement
systematic (i.e., individuals analytically evaluate much more information carefully; Chaiken et
al., 1989) processing. The ease-of-retrieval effect was originally specified in terms of the
heuristic-systematic model and hypothesized to reflect a heuristic (low elaboration) strategy for
individuals for whom the target judgment has low personal relevance (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1984). Two initial articles found that individuals with higher personal relevance
(which presumably increased systematic processing) in a topic reversed the predictions of easeof-retrieval, while individuals with lower personal relevance (which presumably increased
heuristic processing) produced results consistent with ease-of-retrieval (Grayson & Schwarz,
1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). However, Tormala et al. (2002) provides another account of
how involvement should affect the use of feelings of ease. In this view, individuals who
elaborate more should pay attention to their higher-order thoughts and thus incorporate ease into
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their judgments (Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009; Petty et al., 2007;
Tormala et al., 2002). Thus, these authors hypothesize that their manipulation of processing
motivation should have effects opposite to those of the previously mentioned authors (i.e., the
ease-of-retrieval effect should be enhanced). Although the manipulations of involvement are not
identical across studies, they are conceptually focused on personal relevance and the difference
in predictions arises from assumptions about how personal relevance affects the likelihood of
systematic processing. Thus, the meta-analytic results for this moderator are potentially
informative about the relationship between cognitive feelings and systematic processing.
Representativeness (retrieval target). Individuals should be more likely to apply
feelings to target judgments when their feelings are believed to be more representative of the
target of the retrieval task (e.g., your own assertiveness; Schwarz et al., 1991; Greifeneder et al.,
2011). For example, individuals are more likely to display an ease-of-retrieval effect when
making judgments about themselves as opposed to others (e.g., Caruso, 2008) because their
feelings are more representative of themselves than of others. Similarly, the applicability of ease
differs depending on whether individuals judge in-group as compared to out-group members
because their feelings are more representative of the in-group than the out-group (Rothman &
Hardin, 1997; Woltin et al., 2014).
Representativeness (misattribution). Feelings should be less likely to be used as an
input to judgment when the informational value of the feelings has been obviated by other
information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Several studies employ misattribution paradigms in
which participants are given another cause to which subjective ease can be attributed (e.g.,
difficulty due to simultaneous music; e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991). These elements are
hypothesized to render subjective ease non-diagnostic for the judgment (reduce effect sizes)
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because some other source was the reason for ease, so the metacognitive inference about the
meaning of personal ease is discounted (Schwarz et al., 1991; Unkelbach, 2006). In Schwarz et
al. (1991), this source was music; in Ruder and Bless (2003), this source was an oddly-shaped
writing space. Neither of these sources had meaning for the target judgment.
Relevance of feelings (judgment task). Multiple articles within the feelings-asinformation stream of research suggest that people are more likely to use feelings as inputs when
those feelings are perceived to be relevant to the target judgment task (Greifeneder, Bless, &
Pham, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). This is exemplified by Schwarz and Clore’s
(2007) perceived relevance of feelings of ease for a judgment. This concept is different from
perceived informational value because, unlike that construct, relevance focuses on the bearing
feelings have on the judgment task rather than the target of retrieval.
Relevance of feelings (disposition). Relevance may be influenced by such factors as
individual differences (disposition) such as reliance on feelings or expertise (Schwarz & Clore,
2007). Multiple papers within the ease-of-retrieval paradigm suggest experts are less likely to
employ feelings (Ofir, 2000), and those who are more likely to trust their feelings (e.g., higher or
lower experiential style; higher faith in intuition; e.g., Danziger et al., 2005; Keller & Bless,
2009) are more likely to show the ease-of-retrieval effect (i.e., stronger effect sizes).
Exploratory Methodological Moderators
We additionally investigate potential moderators of the ease-of-retrieval effect that are
mainly methodological and have few, if any theoretical implications. Thus, these moderators are
more exploratory in nature.
Year. The ease-of-retrieval effect studies in question range from 1991 to present-day. We
examine whether there is variation in effect sizes depending on publication year, which may be
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concurrent with changes in the methodology and the hunt for more moderators (Mooneyham,
Franklin, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2012; Schooler, 2011).
Country. The ease-of-retrieval effect has been studied across continents in America (e.g.,
Tormala et al., 2002), Australia (e.g., Laham, 2013), Germany (Schwarz et al., 1991), and other
countries.
Publication Status. As in many other meta-analyses, the publication status of studies
may be related to their effect size. Studies with nonsignificant p-values or small effect sizes may
have been rejected by journal editors and relegated to the "filedrawer" or could be hidden within
parts of unpublished dissertations (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).
Number of dependent measures. The number of measures used to measure subjective
ease and the dependent variable of interest also varies widely from study to study. Some studies
include only one measure of ease (e.g., Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), while others include two
(e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2008) or three (e.g., Avnet, 2005). These measures are typically
averaged to form a single ease-of-retrieval index. Similarly, studies measuring trait ratings or
attitudes have substantial variation in their number of measures used to form a composite
dependent variable. We incorporate this variability into our analyses as a measure of precision
and potential measurement error for the hypothesized mediator (i.e., subjective ease) and the
dependent measure of interest. When effect sizes were composed of an average of two dependent
measures with differing number of items (e.g., a one-item scale and a six-item scale), we
averaged the number of items for this variable (yielding 3.5 for the previous example).
Attitude versus non-attitudes. We classify the different dependent measures in this
literature into two broad categories: attitude-based measures and non-attitude measures. These
broad categories are meant to capture potential differences in dependent measure types (such as
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reliability, response bias, or response scale familiarity). Attitude-based measures cover multiple
different types of responses (e.g., self-rated traits, policy evaluations; Ruder & Bless, 2003;
Schwarz et al., 1991), whereas non-attitude include such measures as subjective likelihood and
frequency (e.g., Sanna et al., 2002) or observable behaviors (e.g., Stephen & Pham, 2008).
A Taxonomy of Ease-of-Retrieval Effects:
Standard and Moderated Paradigms, Proximal and Distal Mediation
To determine the extent to which ease mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect, it is necessary
to identify the experimental conditions meant by the authors to conceptually replicate the
original Schwarz et al. (1991) ease-of-retrieval effect. We refer to these conditions as using the
standard paradigm. The remaining experimental conditions, in which authors hypothesize that
the ease-of-retrieval effect will be attenuated or reversed, are said to use a moderated paradigm.
Based on this taxonomy, we construct three datasets: standard, moderated, and combined
(i.e., both paradigms). The combined dataset provides the greatest variation in moderators
because many moderators are held constant in each paradigm (e.g., moderator present or
moderator absent). Therefore, the combined dataset is most useful for assessing the overall
effectiveness of the moderators proposed in the literature to alter the size (and direction) of the
ease-of-retrieval effect. That is, it provides the highest-powered tests of moderation. Also, a
subset of our data includes additional effect sizes that mediation analyses, and the combined
dataset is most useful in identifying the sources of moderation. That is, if a specific moderator
influences the total effect size, we can check whether it has a similar impact on the indirect effect
that is mediated by ease (a x b; see Figure 2) or it exerts influence by increasing the size of the
direct effect (c’), suggesting the presence of other causal factors. The standard paradigm data
provides (1) the best estimate of the size of ease-of-retrieval effect and (2) the best test of
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subjective ease as the best explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect as originally conceived.
Analyses of the total effect from the moderated dataset are included for completeness.
One second, important division in the data pertains to the relationship between the recall
task and the dependent measure of interest. In some studies, subjects are asked to recall examples
of assertiveness and then provide ratings of their assertiveness (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), or
recall reasons in favor or against public transportation before evaluating public transportation
(Wänke et al., 1996). In these cases, the generated examples are directly relevant for the task
used for the dependent measure (often an attitude or likelihood judgment) and, therefore,
constitute clear examples of the feelings-as-information hypothesis that is the focus of this metaanalysis. We refer to the effect sizes from studies of this type as proximal because the impact of
subjective ease on the dependent measure is direct and does not require further assumptions
about how ease should affect the dependent measure of interest.
However, there are also cases in which the few-versus-many manipulation pertains to one
subject matter (e.g., reasons New York is positive or negative; Alter & Balcetis, 2011), while the
dependent measure concerns something not recalled (e.g., how far away New York feels). In
these cases, beyond what is recalled in the few-versus-many manipulation, there must be an
intermediary mechanism that explains the causal relationship between ease and the dependent
measure (e.g., a connection between attitudes towards New York and how far away it feels). We
call these distal effect sizes because there is an additional mediator between ease and the
dependent measure that requires assumptions, theories, or models outside of feelings-asinformation theory. One implication of these intermediary mechanisms is that a null effect may
not be inconsistent with feelings-as-information; the intervening mechanism may be wrong (i.e.,
the non-ease mechanism thought to affect the dependent measure, contrary to predictions, does

16
not). Because of this difference in explanations, we further divide the combined, standard, and
moderated datasets into two subsets that are analyzed separately: proximal and distal. Examples
of proximal and distal effect sizes can be found in Table 1. We perform all analyses on both
datasets; however, the proximal effect sizes are of greater interest because they are more direct
tests of the focal hypothesis that cognitive feelings of ease are being used as information in the
judgment process.
Methodology
Literature Search
The widespread use of the "few-versus-many" manipulation in disparate experimental
literatures made keyword search ineffective because no simple set of keywords could capture the
entire literature efficiently. Sets of keywords such as “ease-of-retrieval” and “retrieval fluency”
did not capture all papers that forward searches of the major articles in the literature did, whereas
the latter yielded all papers found by the former. Therefore, we examined forward citations of the
original empirical paper that reported the ease-of-retrieval effect, Schwarz et al. (1991), and two
major reviews, Schwarz (1998) and Schwarz (2004), using the ISI Web of Knowledge. We also
looked at forward citations of published articles citing Schwarz et al. (1991) that employed the
few-versus-many manipulation within the following ten-year period (1992-2001)1. Additionally,
we searched Proquest Dissertations and Theses database for papers that had the names of the
Schwarz et al. (1991; “Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability
Heuristic”), Schwarz (1998; (“Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The interplay of

1

These articles included Aarts & Dijksterhuis (1999); Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, & Lynn (1998); Broemer
(2001); Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock (1999); Grayson & Schwarz (1999); Haddock, Rothman, & Schwarz
(1996); Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz (1999); Merckelbach, Wiers, Horselenberg, & Wessel (2001); Ofir
(2000); Raghubir & Menon (1998); Rothman & Hardin (1997); Rothman & Schwarz (1998); Vaughn (1999);
Wänke, Bless, & Biller (1996); Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch (1997); Winkielman & Schwarz (2001); and
Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli (1998).
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declarative and experiential information in judgment”), and Schwarz (2004; “Metacognitive
Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making”) in their text as citations. Finally, we
cross-referenced PsychFileDrawer.org and the Reproducibility Project Open Science Framework
for any replications of papers in our search. We completed this search by April 2014.
We then contacted authors2 who had available contact information to inquire about
unpublished studies, effect sizes not reported in their paper, and to ask them to verify our
classification of their experimental conditions into standard and moderated paradigms. As part of
this process we sent spreadsheets to individual authors that contained the effect sizes we had
obtained from their publications. The spreadsheet also indicated which measures were missing
and how we had interpreted their studies in terms of the standard and moderated paradigms. An
example of one of these sheets for Pablo Briñol is provided in Appendix Figure A1. Example email text is provided in Appendix A.
Further, to solicit researchers for other possible file-drawer studies, we sent messages
requesting unpublished data through the following listservs: ACR-L, SCP, SJDM, and SPSP.
Inclusion Criteria
We included articles using the following two criteria:
1) Presence of few-versus-many manipulation: Studies had to include a between-subjects
manipulation that required writing or imagining a smaller number of examples versus a larger
number of examples. We only used between-subjects manipulations given the overwhelming
majority of studies were between-subjects, and because it is unclear how to interpret the withinsubject version of this task since that effect may not be entirely due to ease. We excluded
conditions in which readers reviewed what other writers had produced (e.g., Wänke et al., 1996;

2

We contacted first authors except when an author with multiple publications was also on the publication and was
contacted, or when the first author’s contact information could not be found.
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Weick & Guinote, 2008) because these conditions do not require the task of interest (i.e.,
example generation).
When multiple numbers of arguments were present (e.g., four, eight, and 12 arguments;
e.g., Belli et al., 1998; e.g., one, three, and seven arguments; e.g., Sinha & Naykankuppam, 2013,
Study 1), we only used the minimum and maximum number of arguments conditions that were
of the same topic for computing effect sizes. Only three papers in our final database ultimately
used more than two levels for number of arguments.3
2) Statistics: Studies needed to have enough information from which to calculate a
contrast between the “few” condition and corresponding “many” condition. When information to
compute effect sizes was unavailable, we contacted authors as mentioned earlier.
Meta-Analytic Methodology
We used means and standard deviations, F ratios, t-tests, d values, r values, and log-odds
ratios to compute effect sizes based on standard formulae (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 2008).
Most experiments manipulated some other factor in addition to few-versus-many.
Sometimes all levels were the same paradigm type (e.g., a standard paradigm might manipulate
whether assertiveness or unassertiveness was the dependent measure with the expectation that
these were conceptual replications). Sometimes the manipulation changed the paradigm type
(e.g., control versus alternative attribution for subjective ease). In all cases, each level of the
factor was used to obtain effect sizes. Three effect sizes were sought: (1) the effect of fewversus-many (X) on the dependent variable of interest (Y), (2) the effect of X on subjective ease

3

Excluding the studies that tried multiple levels of few and many conditions does not have an enormous impact on
our effect size results (Standard: r = .253; Moderated: r = -.178; Overall: r = .121).
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(M), and (3) the effect of subjective ease (M) on the dependent variable of interest (Y). We refer
to these effect sizes as mediation triplets.
We calculated effect sizes in terms of Pearson’s r because of its ease of interpretation
across different measures (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). We conducted analyses of the simple
correlations using Fisher’s z for distributional reasons, but we report all results in in terms of r
for interpretability (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). We weight the
effect sizes by their inverse variance (i.e., n-3 for Fisher’s z) using random effects formulae4
from the meta-analysis literature (Borenstein et al., 2009; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001).
We averaged the rXY values across effect sizes for all dependent measures with sufficient
statistical information. We used all measures to prevent biases based on trying to pick only one
dependent measure for each study. Effect sizes of this type were relatively rare, 21% of proximal
effect sizes and 13% of distal effect sizes. For the mediation triplets, we used only one dependent
measure based on which measure had sufficient statistical information available for rMY. When
multiple measures had information for rMY, we used the median value (or minimum of two values
when an even number of values were present); additional analyses with non-included values
yielded similar results. Taking the average of the rMY values for the averaged rXY values could
potentially violate assumptions of mediation analysis (e.g., the indirect effect is the product of
two effect sizes, a and b, and the product of averages is not the same as the average of products),
so this approach was not used.

4 We also note the weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect sizes are different (Standard: r = .144; Moderated: r = -.173; Overall: r

= .083) from our main random-effects results. However, this deviation is primarily due to unpublished effect sizes from the
standard paradigm for studies that are much larger than all other studies (Yeager & Krosnick, 2014). Removing these points
reveals a weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect size that’s not drastically different from the random effects results (Standard: r =
.241; Moderated: r = -.173; Overall: r = .118), and does not affect the conclusions from the moderator results on the total effect.
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Publication Bias
We assessed publication bias by examining the simple ease-of-retrieval effect, rXY, in two
ways: trim-and-fill analysis of funnel plots (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b; Light & Pillemar,
1984) and PET-PEESE (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014).
First, the funnel plot is a graphical display of precision (here standard error) by effect size
(Light & Pillemar, 1984). In a standard funnel plot, effect sizes should converge towards a
tighter estimate of an overall effect size as the studies become more precise, producing a funnel
shape (Sutton, 2009). However, if there is publication bias, there will be an asymmetry in the
funnel for smaller, less precise studies with near-zero effect sizes that may not have had
significant findings to publish (Egger et al., 1997). The trim-and-fill algorithm (Viechtbauer,
2010) "corrects" this asymmetry by first trimming the asymmetric portion of the funnel plot, then
re-estimating the mean effect size and its confidence interval for the remaining studies. Finally,
the trim-and-fill algorithm re-fills in the funnel with both the trimmed studies (that created the
funnel asymmetry) and their corresponding "missing" observations reflected across the mean of
the funnel (Duval & Tweedie, 2000).
Second, PET-PEESE is a method by which an effect size is extracted from the intercept
of an Egger regression that is intended to represent the publication-bias adjusted effect size from
a study with zero standard error (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014).
PET (Precision Effect Test) employs standard error as the predictor in this regression, and errs on
the side of underestimating the true effect size. PEESE (Precision Effect Estimate with Standard
Error) uses variance instead. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014) advise that when PET yields an
intercept significantly different from zero, individuals should rely on the intercept from PEESE
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as the underlying effect size. Otherwise, PET’s estimate of the effect size is more accurate (but,
also see Gervais, 2015).
Moderator Coding
Salience moderators. We coded the three salience moderators discussed earlier as
follows. First, we coded the difference between the number of arguments in the “many” and
“few” conditions as range. Second, we coded whether the measure of subjective ease on
subjective ease occurred before or after the dependent measure of interest (1 = before, -1 = after)
as attention. Finally, we coded polarized attitude as present (+1; -1 otherwise), if such attitudes
were explicitly noted in the paper (e.g., high interest in politics; crystallized attitude; e.g.,
Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999) or if participants were described as having expertise
(which was assuming to imply a polarized attitude).
Inference moderators. We code the six inference moderators discussed earlier as
follows. First, we code processing motivation (depth) based on whether processing depth or
motivation was influenced by a non-involvement manipulation (+1 = increased, -1 = decreased, 0
= no manipulation). Examples of manipulations that would increase processing motivation or
capacity would be inducing sadness (e.g., Ruder & Bless, 2003), boosting accuracy motivation
(e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), or increasing uncertainty (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011a).
Examples of manipulations that decrease processing motivation or capacity would be those that
eat up cognitive resources (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2007) or decrease uncertainty (e.g.,
Greifeneder et al., 2011a). These manipulations should decrease effect sizes if depth is boosted.
Second, we code processing motivation (involvement) based on whether involvement is stated to
be manipulated as more (+1; e.g., higher need for cognition individuals; e.g., Tormala et al.,
2002) or less (-1) personally involving than when involvement is not explicitly manipulated (0).
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Third, we code representativeness (retrieval target) based on whether the target of recall is the
self (+1) or not (-1).5 Fourth, we code representativeness (misattribution) paradigms based on
whether an attribution to another source (e.g., music, an unusual writing space; e.g., Ruder &
Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991) was present (+1) or not (-1). Fifth, we code relevance of
feelings (judgment task) based on whether individuals are making judgments about themselves
(+1) or not (-1).6 Sixth, we code relevance of feelings (disposition) based on whether individuals
are personally more likely to see their feelings as relevant to judgment (+1; e.g., experiential
processors, high-powered individuals; e.g., Danziger et al., 2005; Weick & Guinote, 2008) or
less likely (-1; e.g., individuals with less faith in intuition; e.g., Keller & Bless, 2009; 0 for no
manipulation).
Exploratory methodological moderators. We coded the following study characteristics
as moderators as part of our exploratory analyses: (a) the year, (b) the country in which the study
was published (in the US = +1, non-US = -1), (c) whether the study was published or
unpublished (+1 = unpublished, -1 = published); (d) the number of items in the subjective ease
measure; (e) the number of items in the dependent variable of interest;7 and (f) attitude
dependent measure (e.g., +1 = attitude measure, -1 = all other measures).8
Taxonomy. Based on a careful reading of the authors' hypotheses, experimental
conditions were classified as either a standard or a moderated paradigm. As part of our outreach

5

We alternatively also coded a variable about whether the recall was episodic or semantic. The same results held for
this coding scheme, which was highly correlated with self/not-self.
6 We recognize this has some conceptual overlap with representativeness and may be better categorized as such; the
results for both this moderator and retrieval target are consistent, and we return to these in the general discussion.
7 We cap the maximum number of measures at 9 given 91% of proximal’s distribution and 84% of distal’s
distribution fall between 1-8 measures, and all other measures use far lengthier scales that skew the distribution.
8 One question may revolve around whether attitude certainty measures are coded separately from attitude measures.
These measures comprise a small portion (<5%) of the database and do not significantly differ from any other
category of dependent measure (attitude or non-attitude).
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to authors, we requested authors review our categorization of standard and moderated paradigm
assignments for their experiments. We provided authors with the following definition of
standard and moderated paradigms: "Importantly, we are separating reported results into
experimental conditions that the authors present as conceptual replications of the original effect
reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the standard paradigm -- and conditions in which the authors
change the standard paradigm in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing
attenuation or reversal."
We also separated effect sizes based on whether they were proximal or distal effect sizes
(see earlier discussion and Table 1). In some cases, a paper could contribute both proximal and
distal effect sizes because multiple dependent measures were used (e.g., Alter & Balcetis, 2011;
Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).
Coding reliability. All moderators were originally coded by the first author, and then
coded a second time by at least one of two independent raters to confirm reliability. The first
author was an advanced graduate student in Psychology with completed graduate coursework
training. The two independent coders were undergraduate research assistants with extensive
coursework in psychology and research experience. All coded variables included in the final
analysis had satisfactory or better (i.e., k > .6) agreement.
Mediation Analysis Plan
As noted earlier, a subset of our data includes a measure of ease-of-retrieval in addition to
a dependent measure of interest, and therefore it permits statistical tests of mediation. Mediation
analysis provides a computational method for decomposing the total effect (c) into indirect (a x
b) and direct (c') effects, given the assumption that a variable, M, causally mediates the
relationship between an independent variable, X, and a dependent variable, Y (Baron and Kenny,
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1986; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010; see Figure 2).9 These
estimates quantify the qualitative relationships depicted in Figure 1.
The traditional explanation in the standard paradigm is that subjective ease mediates the
ease-of-retrieval effect (Schwarz, 2004). In terms of the mediation model depicted in Figure 2, a
and b should be large if the traditional explanation holds. More specifically, the traditional
explanation suggests that subjective ease should fully mediate the effect, which implies that the
indirect effect, a x b should be much larger than the direct effect, c'. At a minimum, the
traditional explanation predicts that the indirect effect should be significantly positive. If the
direct effect is found to be substantial (e.g., as large as the indirect effect and significantly
different than zero), then traditional explanation is inadequate insofar as a substantial direct
effect suggests that one or more mediators, other than subjective ease, are involved. In the
moderated paradigm, the mediation should be disrupted (i.e., indirect effect should be reduced)
or some other mediator should exert a stronger influence than feelings of ease (i.e., direct effect
should be increased).
For every triplet of effect sizes (rXM, rMY, and rXY) obtained from the literature or directly
from the authors, standardized regression coefficients were computed based on the traditional
mediation equations with subjective ease as the mediator of the effect of the few-versus-many
manipulation on the dependent measure of interest (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Cohen, Cohen, West,
& Aiken, 2003). These equations are:

9

One area of possible debate is whether subjective ease is a “manipulation check” or a measure of an explanatory
construct; we argue it is the latter. Although many studies report measures of subjective ease as a manipulation
check, we believe "manipulation check" is a misnomer because subjective ease is a mediating psychological
construct. Further, Fiedler et al. (2011) present simulation evidence that manipulation checks should not
significantly mediate the dependent measure of interest. Following this, if subjective ease is found to often pass the
mediation test, then our claim that subjective ease is a measure of a mediator, not a manipulation check, is
supported.
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a = rXM

(1)

b = (rMY – rXY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)

(2)

c' = (rXY – rMY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)

(3)

We did not obtain rMY or estimate mediation models for studies using spotlight analyses
due to the difficulty of obtaining a meaningful correlation at one standard deviation above and
below another factor.10
Results
Literature Search
A total of 152 papers, published and unpublished, were found that employed the fewversus-many manipulation. As of the time of this article, no replications with publicly available
results were available on PsychFileDrawer or the Open Science Framework/Reproducibility
Project.11 There were 121 published papers, 23 dissertations and theses12, and eight unpublished
papers (two studies were left out from a published paper, and 17 studies came from seven
unpublished manuscripts). These 152 papers contained 284 studies. One study was excluded for
using a within-subject design (Corby & Homa, 2011, study 2). Other studies and conditions were
excluded due to insufficient statistical information (e.g., Corby & Homa, 2011; Florack & Zoabi,
2003; Frederick & Mochon, 2012; Hermann et al., 2002; Hirt et al., 2004; Kivetz & Zhang,
2006; Lee, 2005; Ofir, 2000; Sackett, 2006; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Tormala et al., 2002, study

10
11

We thank John Lynch, Jr., for his advice on this topic.
However, a study from Stephen and Pham (2008) was under processing (yet not conducted as of initial
submission) in the OpenScience framework database.
12
We e-mailed 92 authors who had available contact information and were the common links across multiple
papers, of whom 64 (69.57%) responded.
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3; Walton & Cohen, 2007; Wehr, 2010, Study 1; Yahalom & Schul, 2013), as specified above.
These exclusions left 142 papers and 263 studies. Comprehensive tables with effect sizes and
descriptions of studies can be found in Appendix B. The data file can be found in the
Supplemental Materials.
Of the 142 papers, there were 263 studies that yielded 582 effect sizes (i.e., observations
in the database): these 582 effect sizes were composed of 454 proximal and 128 distal.13 Of these
454 proximal observations, 298 were categorized as standard paradigm observations, and 156 as
moderated paradigm observations. The distal observations were composed of 92 standard
paradigm and 36 moderated paradigm observations. For our mediation tests, we had 209 triplets
of rXM, rMY, and rXY, 165 from proximal data (of which 143 were from the standard paradigm)
and 44 from distal data (of which 31 were from the standard paradigm).
A descriptive set of statistics for the 582 effect sizes split into proximal and distal can be
found in Table 2.
Total Effect Analyses (c = rXY)
Overall effect size. All reported analyses of effect sizes and regression models used a
two-level meta-analytic model with random intercepts for papers (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002;
see Singer, 1998 for a similar model). We use a restricted maximum likelihood estimation
method (Littell et al., 2006). The dependent variable was the Fisher z transform of rXY, and all
predictors were standardized. We report the mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals in
Table 3.

13

We also analyze our results excluding the two papers from the proximal analyses that are heavily weighed by our
estimation method: Yeager & Krosnick’s studies, which have several hundred participants per cell (larger than any
other study), and Bares’ (2007) dissertation from which has more observations than for any other paper were
gathered. Removal of these papers does not affect our overall effect sizes drastically (Standard: r = .258; Moderated:
r = -.181; Overall: r = .125).
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We first examine the proximal effect sizes. As shown in Table 3, the mean effect size for
the standard paradigm was positive, rXY = .253, 95% CI [.224, .281], t(110) = 17.05, p < .001),
and the mean effect size for the moderated paradigm was negative, rXY = -.178 (95% CI [-.215, .140], t(52) = -9.27, p < .001). Both the standard and moderated paradigms rejected the null
hypothesis of homogeneity based on Cochran’s Q (standard: Q(297) = 720.795, p < .001; I2 =
58.80%, 95% CI [53.19%, 63.73%]; moderated: Q(155) = 202.26, p = .006; I2 = 23.37%, 95% CI
[5.85%, 37.62%]). An ! " value corresponds to the proportion of total variation attributable to
true heterogeneity and not sampling error; we caution, however, that it does not represent
absolute heterogeneity (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et
al., 2006). We also observe a grand mean effect size of the combined (i.e., standard and
moderated together) dataset14 of rXY = .121 (95% CI [.094, .149]; t(113) = 8.79, p < .001; Q(453)
= 1395.33, p < .001; I2 = 67.53%, 95% CI [64.23%, 70.53%]). We present the distribution of the
individual proximal effect sizes in each paradigm in Figure 3. For the standard paradigm, 91% of
observations are greater than zero. For the moderated paradigm, 83% of observations are less
than or equal to zero.
We next turn to the distal effect sizes, which are depicted in Figure 4 for the standard
(panel A) and moderated (panel B) paradigms. 96% of the standard paradigm observations are
greater than zero, whereas 67% of the moderated observations are at or below zero. The standard
paradigm again had a positive mean effect size (rXY = .264, 95% CI [.221, .307]; t(41) = 11.79, p
< .001; Q(91) = 117.82, p = .031; I2 = 22.76%, 95% CI [0%, 40.86%]), whereas the moderated
paradigm had a negative mean effect size (rXY = -.082, 95% CI [-.158, -.005]; t(19) = -2.23, p =

14

Alternative strategies yield similar results in proximal for nesting within studies (Standard: r = .254; Moderated: r
= -.183; Overall: r = .102) and within clusters of authors (Standard: r = .232, Moderated: r = -.174; Overall: r =
.117), where clusters were defined as sets of frequent co-authors.
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.038; Q(35) = 53.075, p = .026; I2 = 34.06%, 95% CI [0.75%, 56.18%]). The combined dataset
again had a slightly positive effect size (rXY = .164, 95% CI [.128, .201]; t(44) = 8.96, p < .001;
Q(127) = 282.10, p < .001; I2 = 54.98%, 95% CI [45.05%, 63.12%]).
Publication bias. We investigated publication bias using both trim-and-fill and PETPEESE methods (Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Both methods
suggest that publication bias may reduce the ease-of-retrieval effect by up to one-third in
magnitude in the standard paradigm (and reduce the moderated paradigm by about a fifth).
However, the null hypothesis that the true effect size is 0 is still rejected after adjusting for
publication bias.
Funnel plots based on trim-and-fill analyses15 for effect sizes from standard paradigm,
moderated paradigm, and combined datasets for proximal effect sizes are provided in Figure 5.
In Panel A, the funnel depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the
trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel B, the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the
trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel C, the funnel depicts alpha contours assuming the null
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true (white indicates non-significant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey
p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01). The standard paradigm had 88 potentially-missing
observations imputed by trim-and-fill for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in
its confidence interval (r = .159, 95% CI [.137, .181], z = 13.78, p < .001; Q(385) = 983.37, p <
.001). Many of the imputed, potentially missing effect sizes (white circles in Figure 5B),
however, occur in regions of statistical non-significance (p > .10, white), while fewer imputed
effect sizes are in regions of marginal (.05 < p < .10, light grey) or traditional (.01 < p < .05,

15

One difficulty with funnel plots is that missing studies may occur due to multiple reasons, inclusive of nonsignificant results or small study effects. We employ contour-enhanced funnel plots, which illustrate the regions in
which studies are statistically significant. These contours help indicate whether studies are missing from areas of the
chart in which the effect sizes would emerge from non-significant studies (Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008).
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darker grey; p < .01, outside the funnel) statistical significance. So, the asymmetry in the funnel
is more likely to be due to publication bias than from other elements such as variance in study
quality for smaller-sample studies (Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008). In the moderated
paradigm, no studies were filled in (r = -.177, 95% CI [-.206, -.147], z = -11.34, p < .001; Q(155)
= 202.26, p = .006). In the combined dataset, only 33 potentially-missing studies were filled in
for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its confidence interval (r = .080, 95%
CI [.054, .105], z = 6.01, p < .001, Q(486) = 1625.62, p < .001).
Analogous trim-and-fill funnel plots for the distal effect sizes can be found in Figure 6.
The standard paradigm had 31 potentially-missing observations imputed by trim-and-fill for an
adjusted effect size estimate that also did not have 0 in its confidence interval (r = .188, 95% CI
[.154, .221], z = 10.59, p < .001; Q(122) = 222.75, p < .001). In the moderated paradigm, 8
studies were filled in (r = -.013, 95% CI [-.078, .052], z = -0.387, p = .699; Q(43) = 84.61, p <
.001). In this case, the moderated paradigm became nonsignificantly different from zero.
However, given the effect sizes in the moderated paradigm are garnered from studies intended to
attenuate or reverse the effect, this result is not troublesome. In the combined dataset, only 18
potentially-missing studies were filled in for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0
in its confidence interval (r = .132, 95% CI [.092, .172], z = 6.39, p < .001, Q(145) = 373.98, p <
.001).
Our PET-PEESE results on proximal effect sizes similarly suggest a downward
correction of the effect size to account for publication bias. For the standard paradigm, the results
of PET suggest a new effect size of r = .104 (95% CI [.034, .172], t(110) = 2.95, p = .004), while
PEESE points to a more modest correction to r = .193 (95% CI [.153, .232], t(110) = 9.51, p <
.001). Given that we reject the null hypothesis for PET (that the intercept is equal to 0), the value
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from PEESE is generally recommended (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos,
2014). This adjusted value is almost a fourth reduction in the effect size and is less extreme than
the trim-and-fill estimate, so only a fraction of the effect may be explained by publication bias.
Our moderated paradigm results yield similar conclusions from PET (r = -.162, 95% CI [-.276, .043], t(52) = -2.72, p = .009) and PEESE (r = -.179, 95% CI[-.237, -.120], t(52) = -5.99, p <
.001). We again opt for the PEESE estimate based on the PET-PEESE rule to select PEESE if
PET is significantly different from 0 (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos,
2014). On the combined dataset, we see a PET estimate of r = .111 (95% CI [.034, .188], t(113)
= 2.84, p = .005) and a PEESE estimate of r = .121 (95% CI [.078, .164], t(113) = 5.57, p <
.001). Therefore, we see a non-zero effect with PET-PEESE (thus we opt for PEESE), but the
effect sizes warrant an adjustment towards zero from where they were originally.
Analyses on the distal effect sizes yield divergent results from trim-and-fill. The
estimates for the standard paradigm for PET (r = .02, 95% CI [-.077, .115], t(41) = 0.40, p =
.692) are nonsignificant; the same was true for the moderated paradigm (r = .053, 95% CI [-.254,
365], t(19) = 0.35, p = .727). The combined dataset also had a nonsignificant value for PET (r =
.069, 95% CI [-.048, .184], t(44) = 1.19, p = .241). Although the PEESE values for the standard
(r = .140, 95% CI [.081, .198], t(41) = 4.76, p < .001), moderated (r = -.011, 95% CI [-.173,
.151], t(19) = -0.14, p = .89), and combined (r = .109, 95% CI [.041, .176], t(44) = 3.22, p =
.002) datasets were significantly different from zero, we must default to the PET values.
Summarizing, for the studies using distal effect sizes, which makes up a minority of the
overall data, it is plausible that the true effect size is not significantly different from zero.
However, for studies using proximal effect sizes, which are a majority of the overall data, there
is evidence of publication bias (that may adjust the effect size downward by about a third or a
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fourth), but it is unlikely that the ease-of-retrieval effect is solely due to publication bias for two
reasons. First, in the standard and moderated paradigm analyses, both trim-and-fill and PEESE
find the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is far from 0 relative to the mean
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Second, for the standard paradigm, many studies were potentiallymissing from regions of non-significance in the contour trim-and-fill, suggesting that a filedrawer effect is likely.
Finally, we note that trim-and-fill techniques have been challenged in the literature
(Johnson & Eagly, 2014; Terrin et al., 2003), so we acknowledge that the results should be
accepted with some caution. On the other hand, our results are not as susceptible to these
criticisms as they might be because we greatly reduce one source of bias in the trim-and-fill
estimation method (i.e., heterogeneity) by separating the analysis by paradigm and type of
dependent measure in addition to presenting the combined results.
Moderator Analyses
Table 4 presents analyses for the total effect sizes (rXY) based on the combined dataset (N
= 454) and the standard paradigm data only for the proximal paradigm (N = 298) using both a
bivariate regression model for each moderator considered separately and a multiple regression
model that includes all moderators. We find no concerns with collinearity diagnostics for these
predictors. Each predictors’ variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 10 for both the combined
dataset (maximum VIF = 1.56) and the standard paradigm data (maximum VIF = 1.44), and the
maximum condition index was below 30 (Cohen et al., 2003; 2.26 for the combined dataset and
2.12 for the standard paradigm data). The same holds true for Table 5, which depicts the same
analyses for the combined dataset (N = 128, maximum VIF = 2.33, maximum condition index =
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3.16) and standard paradigm data (N = 92, maximum VIF = 2.14, maximum condition index =
2.99) for distal effect sizes.
Salience Moderators. Regarding the salience moderators, we find a strong negative
effect of having a polarized attitude associated with lower effect sizes. This result is consistent
with extant theory suggesting ease to be less prominent for those individuals (Greifeneder, Bless,
& Pham, 2011). However, we find little impact of increased range or attention (via placement of
the subjective ease question, contrary to Kühnen, 2010), even in the standard paradigm.
Inference Moderators. Regarding the inference moderators, there were strong effects of
manipulations of processing motivation (both depth and involvement), misattribution, and
disposition. Manipulations of processing motivation that increased processing depth were
negatively related to effect sizes for proximal, which is consistent with systematic processing
reducing reliance on ease. For involvement-based manipulations of processing motivation, we
observe a small increase in effect size when involvement is high (and decrease with lower
involvement). That is, consistent with Tormala et al. (2002), individuals who have greater
involvement with an issue may rely on higher order thoughts and feelings as a heuristic to
judgment. With respect to representativeness, we find that misattribution paradigms, which alert
participants to task difficulty being non-informative for judgment, clearly reduce (and reverse)
effect sizes. Finally, with respect to relevance based on disposition, we find that people who are
predisposed to use feelings for judgment have larger effect sizes for proximal effect sizes.
However, we also find two results that are inconsistent with our predictions for the
inference moderators. First, we observe a reversal of our expected result for the target of
retrieval. Retrieving information about the self reduces rather than increases effect sizes in the
standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes. Further, we do not find evidence supporting the
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claim that making judgments about yourself leads to larger effect sizes. In fact, we find a reversal
in the standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes.
Exploratory Methodological Moderators. Regarding the exploratory methodological
moderators, we only observe a strong effect for publication status. Unpublished studies have
lower effect sizes than published studies. This result holds both for the combined dataset and for
the standard paradigm data for both proximal and distal effect sizes. However, aside from
publication status, we do not see consistent results across bivariate and multiple regression
models on whether other facets of the dependent measures (e.g., number of measures, type of
measure) have an impact on effect sizes.
Mediation Analyses: Indirect and Direct Effects
Of the 582 values of rXY in the total database, 253 also had associated values of rXM and
rMY. For each of these triplets, standardized regression coefficients from the mediation models,
as defined in Equations 1 - 3, were used to compute estimates of the indirect effect (a x b) and
the direct effect (c'). These estimates were analyzed without transformation.16
Standard Paradigm. The usual explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect predicts that
the indirect effect (a x b) should be large, which we find. The standard paradigm data show
partial mediation of the effect through subjective ease. For the standard paradigm data for
proximal effect sizes, the average indirect (a x b) effect was .114 (95% CI [.074, .154]; t(56) =
5.68, p < .001; Q(142) = 166.916, p = .075; ! " = 14.93%, 95% CI [0%, 31.64%]). However, the
average direct effect (c') was similar in size, .105 (95% CI [.064, .145]; t(56) = 5.19, p < . 001;
Q(142) = 278.555, p < .001; ! " = 49.02%, 95% CI [38.06%, 58.04%]), and the medians were .08
and .12 for indirect and direct effects, respectively. This indicates that subjective ease does not
16

Unlike bivariate correlations, standardized regression coefficients from multiple correlations (i.e., b and c') are
not bounded by -1 and +1, so skewness is less of a concern.
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fully mediate the ease-of-retrieval effect. Moreover, because the direct effect (c') is positive, it
cannot be due to numerosity or evidence strength, which would otherwise yield a negative effect.
Thus, the results of the analysis of mediation model estimates is mixed. The standard explanation
is supported, but the large direct effect is unexplained by the constructs typically discussed in
this literature.
However, distal standard paradigm effect sizes do not show much evidence of mediation
by ease. The indirect effect was .046 (95% CI [-.029, .121], t(15) = 1.32, p =.208; Q(30) =
54.722, p = .004; I2 = 45.18%, 95% CI [16.25%, 64.11%]) and the direct effect was .208 (95%
CI [.144, .272], t(15) = 6.96, p < .001; Q(30) = 56.751, p = .002; I2 = 47.14%, 95% CI [19.52%,
65.28%]). The much larger size of the direct effect, and the relative lack of mediation by ease is
consistent again with the conceptualization of distal effect sizes as requiring an additional step
between ease and the dependent measure of interest.
Combined Dataset. For the proximal effect sizes combined dataset, the standard
explanation was also supported: the indirect effect was .096 (95% CI [.060, .132], t(56) = 5.34, p
< .001; Q(208) = 182.149, p = .902; I2 = 0%). The direct effect (c') was .019 (95% CI [-.105,
.053], t(56) = 1.14, p = .259; Q(208) = 450.362, p < .001; I2 = 53.81%, 95% CI [45.96%,
60.53%]). However, the combined data includes a mix of standard and moderated paradigm
data. As is discussed in the next section, the direct effects for the moderated paradigm are
negative, so when pooled with the positive direct effects of the moderated paradigm, the result is
an average direct effect near zero. For the distal effect sizes combined dataset, we observe an
indirect effect of .034 (95% CI [-.020, .087], t(17) = 1.32, p = .203; Q(43) = 57.185, p = .072; I2
= 24.81%, 95% CI [0%, 48.52%]), and a direct effect of .112 (95% CI [.034, .191], t(17) = 3.02,
p = .008; Q(43) = 116.093, p < .001; I2 = 18.98%, 95% CI [0%, 44.64%]). As compared to the
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indirect effect, the direct effect was much larger for the distal effect sizes, which is consistent
with the distal model’s operationalization as requiring another non-ease explanation between
ease and dependent measure. Moderated Paradigm. For the moderated paradigm, the average
direct effect is negative. For proximal effect sizes’ moderated paradigm data, the average effect
size of the direct effect (c') is -.205 (95% CI [-.273, -.137]; t(25) = -6.18, p < .001, Q(65) =
84.174, p = .055, ! " = 22.78%, 95% CI [0%, 43.55%]), which is a reversal of the ease effect, and
is consistent with numerosity or evidence strength. However, the indirect (a x b) effect for these
proximal effect sizes was significantly greater than zero, .042 (95% CI [.010, .073]; t(25) = 2.75,
p = .011, Q(65) = 14.216, ns; I2 = 0%), which suggests that some ease-related effect is present,
but is too small to overcome the negative direct effect created by the moderator manipulation. On
the other hand, for the distal effect sizes, the indirect effect was .002 (95% CI [-.034, .037], t(8)
= 0.11, p = .92; Q(12) = 1.632, ns; I2 = 0%) and the direct effect was -.121 (95% CI [-.232, .010], t(8) = -2.51, p = .036; Q(12) = 15.005, p = .241), which again demonstrates that there is
little evidence of mediation by ease for distal effect sizes.
Mediation Analyses: Moderators of the Indirect and Direct Effects
Tables 6 and 7 present moderator results for indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects for
triplets pooled over the standard and moderated paradigms for proximal and distal, respectively
(see tables in Appendix C for standard paradigm moderator results). As a reference point, Tables
6 and 7 also present estimates of the total effect (c).
For salience moderators, we observe three results. Range has little effect, polarized
attitudes moderate all effects, and attention has little or no effect.
For inference moderators, all moderators except involvement affect the direct effect for
proximal effect sizes, suggesting they invoke non-ease processes. Representativeness based on
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retrieval target affected the direct effect as well for proximal, but it affected the indirect effect for
distal effect sizes. Thus, the overall pattern of estimated coefficients is consistent with
explanations that require new mediators that are typically not measured, or even identified, in the
ease-of-retrieval literature.
Interpreting Mediation Results: Heterogeneity, Measurement Error, and Correlated Error
The results of the mediation portion of this meta-analysis are more complex than the
single effect size analysis for rXY. That is, examining a histogram of all observations, plus means,
and statistics such as I2 provides a good assessment of both the effect and the amount of
heterogeneity in effect size for rXY. However, when the unit of observation is a triplet of
correlations that have implications for assessing mediation (i.e., indirect and direct effects), the
interpretation of results is much more complicated (see Albarracin et al., 2000).
Two complications, heterogeneity and the statistical assumptions of mediation models,
are particularly important. First, regarding heterogeneity, there can be dense, multidimensional
clusters of points that are not evident in the marginal distributions of each measure considered
separately. Importantly, the marginal means (or medians) of each measure may not be
representative of any specific cluster or even any individual observation. We are particularly
interested in the estimates of indirect (a x b) and direct effects (c') for the standard paradigm
because the consensus in the literature is that mediation by subjective ease should be robustly
evident in this paradigm. Indeed, "full mediation" is often implied, and other potential mediators
are seldom discussed (i.e., the indirect effect should be much larger than the direct effect). We
examined mediation heterogeneity using the simplest methods described in Hutchinson,
Kamakura, and Lynch (2000). Figure 8 (Panel A) displays each observation from the standard
paradigm (where mediation is most likely) plotted using the indirect and direct effects as
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coordinates (black markers for proximal effect sizes, gray markers for distal effect sizes).
Although the central tendencies are positive, as expected, for the indirect effects (mean = .10,
median = .07) and the direct effects (mean = .13, median = .14), there is considerable
heterogeneity, as indicated by the size of the scatterplot. Moreover, visual inspection of Figure 8
(confirmed by k-means clustering) reveals three clusters: (1) a dense region just above the 45degree, which reflects the presence of both direct and indirect effects with the former being
slightly larger, (2) a diffuse region above and left of the first, which reflects large direct effects
and near zero indirect effects, and (3) a diffuse region below and right of the first, which reflects
large indirect effects and near zero direct effects. Only the third cluster contains triplets that
might be called full mediation. The k-means cluster analysis revealed that this third cluster
includes only 27% of the observations; however, as might be expected, 98% of this cluster are
proximal.
Hutchinson et al. (2000) recommend simply counting the number of observations
consistent with a hypothesis as a straightforward way to mitigate aggregation biases due to
heterogeneity. One simple test of consistency with full mediation is the number of observations
for which the indirect effect is larger than the direct effect. Note that this is a rather weak test that
favors full mediation. As can be seen in Table 8 this inequality holds for only 47% of proximal
effect sizes and 13% of distal effect sizes. A simple test of mediation of any size that is
consistent with the traditional explanation of the ease-or-retrieval effect is the number of
observations for which the indirect effect is positive. Here the evidence is much stronger: 80%
for proximal effect sizes and 74% for distal effect sizes. Overall, these analyses of heterogeneity
suggest that some level of mediation is often present, but that mediation is the dominant
explanation of the total effect for a relatively small set of proximal observations. Similarly, a
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positive direct, which suggests another mediator is influential, is often present (71% of proximal
observations and 90% of distal observations; see Table 8). However, the direct effect is the
dominant explanation of the total effect for a relatively small set of observations (about 13% of
observations based on the k-means cluster analysis, of which 65% are proximal). Most
observations (about 60%) are consistent with multiple mediators. Thus, while ease often partially
mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect, that is far from the whole story.
The second complication is that the assumptions of traditional mediation analyses may
not hold and, if not, the resulting effect size estimates will be biased. Most published mediation
analyses in the psychological literature have adopted an OLS regression model in which
independent (X), dependent (Y), and mediator (M) variables are all treated as fixed effects (e.g.,
Baron & Kenny, 1986). Many methodologists have pointed out that this approach entails several
very strong assumptions that are unlikely to be true (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010;
MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Two assumptions are
especially problematic: no measurement error for M and uncorrelated error between M and Y.
Figure 7 extends the simple mediation model depicted in Figure 2 to depict measurement error
and correlated error. Measurement error in M creates a negative bias in the OLS estimate of b
and a positive bias in c'. For example, even if the true direct effect is zero, OLS will estimate c'
to be greater than zero because X can compensate for the measurement error in M. In contrast,
correlated error in M and Y (usually assumed to be due to some unmeasured confounding
variable; i.e., C in Figure 7) creates a positive bias in the OLS estimate of b and a negative bias
in c'. Thus, the two problematic aspects of error structure have opposite effects. Thus, the
magnitude of the combined bias is less than would be the case if measurement error and
correlated error had directionally consistent biases. However, it is important to note that it is
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highly unlikely that the two biases will exactly cancel out. Moreover, the direction of the
combined bias is unknown, so OLS estimates of the indirect effect could be either overestimates
or underestimates (see Fritz, Kenny, and MacKinnon, 2016, for a more detail discussion).
For the ease-of-retrieval effect, plausible confounding variables include response style
(e.g., Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012) and halo
effects (e.g., people who feel they are very assertive also feel that all tasks are easy for them).
None of the potential remedies for these biases that are discussed in the literature are possible for
this meta-analysis because the only available data are the three correlations among the
variables.17 Thus, the interpretation of our results for mediation triplets depends on the
assumptions one is willing to make about error structure for M and Y. It is important to note,
however, that because of random assignment to the levels of X, the total effect, rXY, is unaffected
by either measurement error or correlated error for M. So, it is not the ease-of-retrieval effect,
but the explanation of the effect, that is at risk and dependent on strong assumptions.
To assess the potential biases due to error structure, we adjusted the estimates of the
indirect and direct effects using the approach recently described by Fritz, Kenny, and
MacKinnon (2014, 2016; see Appendix D).18 Figure 8 (Panel B) displays a plot of adjusted effect
sizes for the standard paradigm. Table 8 reports medians and heterogeneity measures for
standard paradigm effect sizes that were adjusted for measurement error in M only, adjusted for
correlated error between M and Y only, and adjusted for both types of error biases. It is
important to note that these adjustments, although based on the literature, do not necessarily

Recommendations for avoiding these biases include more sophisticated estimation methods (e.g., structural
equation models, instrumental variable methods, principal stratification, and inverse probability weighting; see
MacKinnon & Pirlott, 2015) and experimental manipulations of the mediator (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010).
18 We thank Matthew Fritz and David MacKinnon for comments and advice regarding our application of their
results. Of course, we are solely responsible for the analyses, including any errors they might contain.
17
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provide better estimates of the "true" effect sizes. The value of examining the adjusted estimates
is in understanding the extent to which these biases might change our conclusions and the extent
to which are conclusions are robust with respect to these possible biases. Ultimately, each bias
acting alone changed the effect sizes in the direction consistent with our earlier discussion:
adjusting for measure error made the indirect effect stronger and adjusting for correlated error
made the indirect effect weaker. When both were present at plausible levels, the indirect effect
was weakened. Thus, although our earlier analysis of mediation based on traditional OLS
methods suggested that the direct and indirect effects were about the same in size for proximal
data (see Table 3), our analyses of heterogeneity and error structure (see Table 8) strongly
suggest that the indirect effect is smaller than the direct effect most of the time. However, none
of the adjustments reversed or even challenged our earlier conclusions that there is considerable
heterogeneity in viable explanations and that, while ease often partially mediates the ease-ofretrieval effect, full mediation is rare. Thus, "ease of retrieval" is far from the whole story, even
for proximal data collected using the standard paradigm.
General Discussion
People do not always employ fact-based evidence to make decisions (Albarracin et al.,
2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Many
research traditions have investigated alternatives to the effortful evaluation of objective evidence,
including use of quick heuristics (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1993), reducing negative emotions (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998), and thinking less
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). A large research stream posits that people use how
they feel about something as an input to judgment: the feelings-as-information framework
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In this tradition, affective feelings, cognitive feelings, and bodily

41
experiences such as facial feedback inform the decision-making process (Greifeneder, Bless, &
Pham, 2007; Schwarz, & Clore, 2007; Stepper & Strack, 1993).
This meta-analysis examined a frequent instantiation of the impact of cognitive, the easeof-retrieval effect, and the results have clear implications for the more general question of how
feelings are used in judgment. In the ease-of-retrieval effect, individuals generate varying
numbers of examples of content and are hypothesized to employ feelings of ease experienced in
this task instead of alternative inputs to judgment (Schwarz et al., 1991).
We analyzed 582 effect sizes from 263 studies in 142 papers. These effect sizes were
based on dependent measures that were either proximal (N = 454) or distal (N = 128) in their
hypothesized relationship to subjective ease. 298 proximal and 92 distal effect sizes were from
experimental conditions using the standard paradigm (i.e., authors were attempting to
conceptually replicate the original effect reported by Schwarz et al., 1991); 156 proximal and 36
distal effect sizes were from experimental conditions using moderated paradigms in which
authors were attempting to reduce or reverse the ease-of-retrieval effect. Additionally, we were
able to conduct mediation analyses for 209 proximal and 44 distal effect sizes, decomposing
each total effect into an indirect (a x b) and a direct (c') effect.
The results of our analyses have several implications for feelings-as-information theory
and for metacognition, in general. We focus on the implications from the proximal paradigm
because they represent results under “ideal conditions” for demonstrating that cognitive feelings
are a mediating mechanism.
First, on average, the standard paradigm exhibits a robust, medium-sized effect (rXY = .25
for proximal, .26 for distal) of the few-versus-many manipulation on a wide variety of judgment
tasks. Publication bias was found to be present. We estimate that it reduces the average effect
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size by about one third or a fourth in the standard paradigm for proximal data, leaving most of
the effect to be explained by other factors. Therefore, we find robust evidence that inductions of
a cognitive feeling (i.e., subjective ease) influences judgment.
Second, about half of the ease-of-retrieval effect in standard paradigms that use proximal
dependent measures is mediated by subjective ease when the traditional OLS mediation model is
used to estimate indirect and direct effects (on average, a x b = .11 and c' = .11, see Table 3).
This supports the standard explanation of the effect and presents convincing evidence of the use
of feelings as inputs to judgment. However, it also suggests that other mediators are commonly
present, but seldom identified. The standard explanation survived analyses that incorporated
heterogeneity, measurement error, and correlated error. However, the estimated size of the
indirect was further reduced in these analyses, while the estimated direct effect was increased.
This mediation analysis serves as a call to action for researchers to find new theories and
experimental paradigms that will explicate the robust, and unexplained, direct effect uncovered
in this meta-analysis. Finally, studies characterized as distal based on having measures being less
directly connected to ease had a far smaller indirect effect in the standard paradigm, supporting
the distinction between proximal and distal.
Third, for moderated paradigms for proximal effect sizes, the indirect effect is much
smaller than for the standard paradigm (but still significantly positive), and the direct effect is
negative and larger in magnitude. These results strongly suggest that other mediators are at work
in the moderated paradigm.
Fourth, several moderators were found to contribute to variations in effect size (see Table
4). Importantly, five moderators were designed to represent the types of moderators of feelingsas-information posited elsewhere in the literature (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011), which
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appeared as manipulations in the moderated paradigms. Thus, they inform us both about the
operation of feelings as information and possible explanations of the observed differences
between the standard and moderated paradigms. All five moderators were found to account for
significant amounts of the variation in effect sizes in the total database.
For salience moderators (i.e., those affecting the experience and accessibility of
subjective ease), we found two important results: one positive and one null. Polarized attitudes
reduced the ease-of-retrieval effect. For these participants who had competing inputs to ease
(e.g., a polarized attitude for politics; e.g., Haddock, 2002), effect sizes were negative. However,
contrary to what Kühnen (2010) argues, we found only a small, non-significant effect of the
subjective ease question appearing before the dependent measure (versus after or no question) in
any dataset.
For inference moderators (i.e., those affecting the relationship between ease and the
dependent measure), we found several important results for proximal effect sizes. Manipulations
of processing motivation that increased processing depth (but were not related to involvement)
reduced effect sizes, which is suggestive that increased cognitive resources made systematic
processing strategies more likely (Chaiken et al., 1989). However, manipulations of processing
motivation that increased involvement were positively related to the ease-of-retrieval effect,
which is consistent with the Tormala et al. (2002) framework. Participants who have heightened
personal relevance may be more cognizant of their higher order feelings. Further,
representativeness (misattribution) reduced the ease-of-retrieval effect, consistent with the
hypothesized reduced informativeness of cognitive feelings (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011).
Finally, people predisposed toward using cognitive feelings exhibited larger ease-of-retrieval
effects.
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Fifth, when the indirect and direct effect sizes were analyzed separately, many
moderators were found to affect one, but not the other (see Tables 6 and 7). For salience
moderators of proximal effect sizes, the polarized attitude moderator influenced the indirect and
direct effect sizes. In contrast, the inference moderators affected direct effect sizes much more
than indirect effect sizes for proximal effect sizes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the
moderator manipulations used in the literature achieved their results mainly by introducing new
mediators that had effects opposite to those of subjective ease.
Sixth, two moderators that were based on degree of self-reference (i.e., representativeness
[retrieval target] and relevance [judgment task]) were not consistent with our initial predictions
and were reversed for the standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes. This result may mean that
these moderators are less related to representativeness and relevance, but instead function
similarly to depth of processing motivation. That is, self-referential retrieval and judgment may
encourage more systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989).
Finally, we find few methodological factors that have a large influence on proximal or
distal effect sizes. That the ease-of-retrieval effect is robust across these manipulations supports
the usefulness of the manipulation in the span of inductions of cognitive feelings to be used as
information, and it diminishes concerns about other possible methodological artifacts.
Methodological Implications for Few-Versus-Many Studies
Our meta-analysis also has implications for ease-of-retrieval studies in the future,
inclusive of the way the few-versus-many manipulation is conducted.
First, while our work suggests no aggregate differences between whether the ease
question is placed before or after the dependent measure, there may be reason to place the
question after the dependent measure to avoid demand characteristics explanations (Kühnen,
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2010). In some situations, however, there may be theory-driven reasons for including the ease
question before the dependent measure (e.g., salience; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; see
also Danziger et al., 2005). Therefore, the exact placement of this question should consider both
concerns. However, we also recommend that studies that manipulate the placement of the ease
question explicitly test whether the placement influences the results in a specific paper (see
Feldman & Lynch, 1988).
Second, we recommend increased sample sizes to increase power. In a simple two-cell
design, given our effect size, an experimenter would need to run approximately 58 participants
per cell for proximal and 53 for distal to achieve a power of .8. In the standard paradigm for the
proximal model in this meta-analysis, we find that, when excluding the largest designs (N >
300), an average of 25 participants are run per cell, which would only be powered at .45 for each
two-cell comparison. In the distal paradigm, there were only 30 participants per cell, leading to a
power estimate of .56. We recognize that we reduced power by splitting designs by moderators
and that, in many cases, the full ANOVA had more statistical power than disaggregated two-cell
comparisons due to pooled estimates of the error term (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000).
However, as illustrated by our meta-analyses, splitting data into standard and moderated
paradigms enables informative tests of mediation.
Broader Implications of this Meta-Analysis
This meta-analysis arrives at an important time within the fields of social psychology,
consumer behavior, and judgment and decision-making. Many well-known effects are being revisited because of failures to replicate (e.g., behavioral priming; Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al.,
2013; Rohrer et al., 2015; Shanks et al., 2013), and many researchers are engaging in debates
over the existence of published effects (e.g., choice overload: Chernev, Bockenholt, & Goodman,
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2015; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010; unconscious thought theory: Nieuwenstein et
al., 2015). Due to these challenges, many authors of previously published effects are reluctant to
provide information, data, or even communicate about their prior work. The robustness of the
ease-of-retrieval effect found in this meta-analysis presents a case in which published effects are
not overly controversial. Many authors who were contacted for data were not only willing to
respond, but often provided missing data and unpublished studies with non-significant results or
with offers to contact other colleagues for their file-drawer contents. Thus, this meta-analysis
underscores the value of sharing data and experimental details.
More substantively, we report that a commonly-employed manipulation leads to an easeof-retrieval effect of moderate size. This result is important due to the strong connection of this
effect to other phenomena in psychology such as the availability heuristic (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973) and various fluency effects (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). This manipulation
is one cornerstone of a broader set of ideas about the impact of cognitive feelings as information
in judgment and decision-making (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
This meta-analysis also extends the boundaries of other meta-analytic endeavors by
examining the proposed mediator of an effect in addition to the effect itself. This approach
allows the total effect to be decomposed into an indirect effect and a direct effect. Thus, the
adequacy of the proposed mediator can be tested, in addition to its existence. Moreover,
moderators can be related to the direct and indirect effects, shedding light on the mechanisms of
moderation. Finally, when substantial direct effects are revealed by the meta-analysis (as was
the case here), this serves to motivate future research to uncover the associated mediators.
Finally, we believe this meta-analysis serves as a call for pre-registered, large-scale
replications of the broad category of effects using highly-powered studies. Several studies in the
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database relied on smaller samples compared to what others advocate (e.g., n > 30; Simmons et
al., 2011). It is prudent to recommend pre-registered, pretested (in terms of number of “few” and
“many” arguments), high-powered replications to demonstrate ease-of-retrieval across a variety
of policy, consumer, health, and other domains. These pre-registered replications ensure that
there is no cherry-picking of dependent-measures.
Potential Limitations
Data availability due to the passage of time was a major factor in being able to attain
missing information, especially from early research. Notably, we had far fewer triplets of
correlations because less than half of the studies that included a subjective ease question reported
rMY. We thus faced two layers of publication bias: those studies that were not published due to
failing to find significant results, and those studies with significant results but incomplete
reporting (especially, no correlation between ease and the dependent measure). When reaching
out to authors we encountered multiple instances of inability to recover these missing
correlations because the raw data were no longer available.
Another source of missing data arises when the goal of using the few-versus-many
manipulation is simply to provide an alternative procedure for manipulating another construct
(e.g., connectedness with a future self; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). Thus, there may be other
filedrawers filled with ease-of-retrieval studies in which the investigation was not interested in
ease-of-retrieval per se (i.e., distal studies).
Further, we recognize that some studies that rely on the ease-of-retrieval effect do not use
the few-versus-many manipulation (e.g., Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007; Raghubir & Menon,
2001). In this meta-analysis, we chose to concentrate solely on the few-versus-many
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manipulation to ensure that we had comparable effect sizes (when accounting for proximal and
distal).
Future Directions
Our meta-analysis revealed that subjective ease is, at most, a partial mediator of the easeof-retrieval effect. Thus, one important future direction is to explore alternative explanations,
such as unrequested cognitions (Tormala et al., 2007; but see Wänke et al., 1996). The addition
of questions to measure these and other explanations is straightforward.
Second, future research should examine the ecological validity of subjective ease, as
generated by the few-versus-many manipulation (see Hertwig et al., 2013). While work in the
field has established how naïve beliefs about ease may factor into everyday judgments (Schwarz,
2004), researchers have only occasionally asked whether the attributions drawn by individuals
are beneficial or detrimental (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). That is, feelings may be “nonnormative” as decision inputs, but they may not be “sub-optimal” from a broader perspective.
For example, Pham et al. (2012) demonstrate that peoples’ predictions may be improved through
relying on their feelings based on the few-versus-manipulation. Future research should examine
how and when relying on feelings of ease may be adaptive or maladaptive.
Conclusions
How people rely on their feelings has been a strong area of research for several decades
(Greifender, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007; Zajonc & Markus, 1982).
Substantive research topics have spanned both affective (e.g., sadness; Lerner & Tiedens, 2001)
and cognitive (e.g., ease; Whittlesea, 1993) feelings as they apply to a large variety of outcomes.
One often-studied cognitive feeling has been the subjective ease of recall for judgment-related
examples.
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This meta-analysis addressed the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-retrieval
effect?" Our results suggest the answer is "Yes, but ..." We found that the effect in the standard
paradigm is robust for proximal effect sizes, although up to one-third of the effect may be due to
publication bias and the effect can be reduced even more by heterogeneity and correlated error.
These results also speak to the role of feelings as decision inputs within the feelings-asinformation theoretical framework. As for our focal question, we found that subjective ease is a
robust mediator, but that an unexplained direct effect is equally robust in both standard and
moderated paradigms. For moderated paradigms, authors have identified and manipulated
specific theory-based variables. However, the large residual direct effect for standard paradigms
serves as a call to action for future research to answer the question, "What else mediates the
ease-of-retrieval effect?"
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Table 1.
Example cases of proximal and distal effect sizes.
Division and Paper

Reason
Proximal

Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999
Biswas et al. 2012

Haddock 2002

Keller and Bless 2009
Novemsky et al. 2007
Pocheptsova et al. 2010
Schwarz et al. 1991
Tsai and Thomas 2011

People recall instances of biking, then they make judgments about how
frequently they bike.
Participants come up with reasons why a car may have starting problems;
participants judge likelihood that a 5-year old used Volkswagen car might fail to
start anytime within the next 6 months.
People recall reasons to like/dislike Tony Blair, then they make judgments about
Tony Blair.
Participants think of few or many things in their life impacted by having a right leg
amputated; perceived negative affect duration was the DV.
People imagine having to generate reasons for choosing a given product, then they
make a choice of product.
People think of occasions for going to a restaurant; willingness-to-pay for dinner
in that restaurant is the DV.
People recall assertive/unassertive instances; they make judgments of
assertiveness.
People imagine reasons to donate or not, then they decide whether/how much to
donate.
Distal

Alter and Balcetis 2011
Bartels and Urminsky 2011
Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2005
Muller et al. 2011
Pham et al. 2012
Schlegel et al. 2011

Sussman and Alter 2012

People consider positive or negative elements of NYC, then they rate the felt
distance to NYC. The attitude towards NYC is meant to be related to its
subjective distance.
People consider how hard it would be to generate reasons their identity would
remain stable, then their discount factor is assessed. Feelings of connectedness to
the future identity is argued to be related to discount factor.
People come up with exemplars of minorities they like, then they complete
measures of implicit stereotyping (RT as dependent measure). Accessibility is
argued to be related to our attitudes.
Participants come up with few or many unfair things about a negotiation game;
the main DV is cooperation in the negotiation game. There is supposed to be a
linkage between perceived unfairness and cooperation.
People recall times they were correct in trusting their feelings, then make
predictions about some outcome. Trust in feelings is argued to be related to
prediction accuracy.
People come up with descriptors of themselves, then judge meaning in life.
Knowing oneself is argued to be related to meaning in life.
Participants think of items they had bought from a product category; willingnessto- pay for items from that category (based on subsequent questions) was the DV.
Perceived category size is related to perceptions of being extraordinary and thus
willingness-to-pay.
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Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics of Ease-of-Retrieval Effect Sizes.
Variable

Proximal (N = 454)

Distal (N = 128)

2006 (5.25)
2007

2009 (3.33)
2010

254 (55.9)
200 (44.1)

97 (75.8)
31 (24.2)

350 (77.1)
104 (22.9)

101 (78.9)
27 (21.1)

298 (65.6)
156 (34.4)

92 (71.9)
36 (28.1)

22 (4.8)
432 (95.2)

2 (1.6)
126 (98.4)

160 (35.2)
294 (64.8)

74 (57.8)
54 (42.2)

256 (56.4)
198 (43.6)

103 (80.5)
25 (19.5)

22 (4.8)
432 (95.2)

0 (0)
128 (100)

2.50 (1.11) [2]
8.60 (2.95) [8]

2.44 (0.99) [2]
9.47 (3.08) [10]

106 (23.3)
290 (63.9)
58 (12.8)

32 (25)
42 (32.8)
54 (42.2)

369 (81.3)
85 (18.7)
1
2

70 (54.7)
58 (45.3)
1
2

Year
M (SD)
Median
Country
United States (%)
Non-US (%)
Publication Type
Journal Article (%)
Unpublished (%)
Paradigm
Standard (%)
Moderated (%)
Misattribution
Present (%)
Absent (%)
Target of Retrieval
Self (%)
Not Self(%)
Target of Judgment
Self (%)
Not Self (%)
Polarized Attitude
Yes (%)
No (%)
Arguments
M, Few (SD) [Median]
M, Many (SD) [Median]
Measure of Subjective Ease
Before DV (%)
After DV (%)
None (%)
DV Type
Attitude (%)
Non-Attitude (%)
Median, Number of Ease Items
Median, Number of Measures
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Table 3.
Overall Effect Sizes [95% CIs] for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect.
Effect Size

Combined
Standard/Moderated

Standard
Paradigm

Moderated
Paradigm

Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Proximal
c (all data)

.121 [.094, .149]

.253 [.224, .281]

-.178 [-.215, -.140]

c (mediation triplets)

.109 [.073, .145]

.223 [.184, .262]

-.166 [-.230, -.100]

Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Proximal
c’ (mediation triplets)

.019 [-.105, .053]

.105 [.064, .145]

-.205 [-.273, -.137]

a x b (mediation triplets)

.096 [.060, .132]

.114 [.074, .154]

.042 [.010, .073]

Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Distal
c (all data)

.164 [.128, .201]

.264 [.221, .307]

-.082 [-.158, -.005]

c (mediation triplets)

.154 [.085, .221]

.308 [.219, .393]

-.125 [-.231, -.015]

Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Distal
c’ (mediation triplets)

.112 [.034, .191]

.208 [.144, .272]

-.121 [-.232, -.010]

a x b (mediation triplets)

.034 [-.020, .087]

.046 [-.029, .121]

.002 [-.034, .037]
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Table 4.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for proximal.
Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data
Number of
Mean Effect Size
Regression
Moderator
Level
Effect
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2
Sizes
Salience Moderators
Range
454
.009 (.013)
.015
Attention
Polarized Attitude

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

106
348

Yes (+1)
No (-1)

22
432

.114 (.023)
.124 (.015)

-.002

-.140 (.056) ***
.134 (.014)

-.064 ***

Standard Paradigm Data Only
Number of
Effect
Sizes

Mean Effect Size
(S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

298

-.005 (.012)

.012

73
225

.245 (.019)
.255 (.016)

-.005

-----

-----

---

---

---

---

-----

-----

---

---

-----

-----

Inference Moderators
Processing
Motivation
(depth)

High (+1)

12

No manipulation (0)
Low (-1)

417
25

.128 (.014)
.150 (.057)

High (+1)

26

.178 (.057)

No manipulation (0)
Low (-1)

404
24

.124 (.015)
.008 (.061)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

160
294

.108 (.022)
.130 (.018)

Representativeness
(misattribution)

Present (+1)
Absent (-1)

22
432

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

256
198

High (+1)
No manipulation (0)
Low (-1)

15
426
13

Processing
Motivation
(involvement)

Relevance
(disposition)

-.184 (.076) ***

^

-.246 (.065) ***
.136 (.014)
.123 (.018)
.121 (.021)
.226 (.076) ***
.128 (.014)
-.194 (.083)

-.034 **

.030 **

-019
-.092 ***
-.001
.045 ***

114
184
----180
118
-------

.196 (.021) ***
.286 (.017)
----.221 (.018) ***
.298 (.021)
-------

---

-.030 *
---.028*
---

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1
Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2
Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.
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Table 4 (continued).
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results

Moderator

Level

Year

Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data
Number of
Mean Effect Size
Regression
Effect
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2
Sizes
Exploratory Methodological Moderators
454
-.006 (.013)
-.011

Mean Effect Size
(S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

298

-.008 (.010)

-.009

170
128

.232 (.019)
.280 (.022)

^

-.007

65
233

.137 (.030)
.277 (.015)

***

-.053

^

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

254
200

.117 (.018)
.127 (.021)

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

104
350

.044 (.027)
.137 (.015)

Number of measures (M)

454

.011 (.014)

.014

298

.025 (.014)

Number of measures (Y)

454

.0002 (.014)

-.001

298

.016 (.012)

Attitude (+1)

369

.112 (.015)

-.019

239

.241 (.017)

Non-Attitude (-1)

85

.155 (.030)

59

.292 (.030)

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

.0004

Standard Paradigm Data Only
Number of
Effect
Sizes

**

-.035

*

***

.015
.014

^

-.025

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1
Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2
Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.

^
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Table 5.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal.
Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data
Number of
Mean Effect Size
Regression
Moderator
Level
Effect
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2
Sizes
Salience Moderators
Range
128
-.009 (.019)
-.005
Attention

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

32
96

.170 (.043)
.165 (.022)

Standard Paradigm Data Only
Number of
Effect
Sizes

Mean Effect Size
(S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

92

-.009 (.019)

-.008

22
70

.320 (.043)
.242 (.027)

.017

.021

Inference Moderators
Processing
Motivation

6

-.036 (.107)

---

---

---

118

.176 (.021)

---

---

---

Low (-1)

4

.115 (.097)

High (+1)

1

.331 (.207)

---

---

---

126

.167 (.019)

---

---

---

Low (-1)

1

-.064 (.201)

---

---

---

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

74
54

.162 (.023)
.194 (.033)

Representativeness
(misattribution)

Present (+1)
Absent (-1)

2
126

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

103
25

.159 (.021)
.197 (.044)

-.028

Relevance
(disposition)

High (+1)
No Manip (0)

2
124

-.015 (.188)
.165 (.019)

-.040

2

.409 (.208)

(depth)

Processing
Motivation
(involvement)

High (+1)
No Manip (0)

No Manip (0)

Low (-1)

-.250 (.227) ^
.170 (.020)

-.018

.026

-.018

50
42

-.062 *

-----

-.023

----76
16

^

.226 (.030) ^
.307 (.033)
-----

.274 (.025)
.238 (.051)

.001

-----

-----

-----

---

---

---

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
Year
Country

128

-.020 (.022)

-.051

92

-.035 (.024)

USA (+1)

97

.169 (.022)

.025

73

.268 (.026)

Non-USA (-1)

31

.157 (.040)

19

.254 (.047)

-.038
^

.026

90
Publication Status3

Number of
measures (M)
Number of
measures (Y)
Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Filedrawer (+1)

27

.096 (.045)^

Published (-1)

101

.176 (.019)

128

.009 (.021)

128
Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (-1)

-.038

17

.212 (.054)

75

.276 (.025)

-.049

.002

92

.033 (.020)

.033

-.019 (.021)

-.020

92

.021 (.021)

.019

70

.179 (.028)

-.004

51

.275 (.029)

0

58

.155 (.027)

41

.250 (.031)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1
Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2
Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.
3
Model for bivariate analyses in combined dataset was unable to be run for this covariate; we removed the random intercept for this bivariate analysis.

^
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Table 6.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect (combined dataset) for
proximal.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')

Regression
Coefficient2

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

Salience Moderators
Range
Attention
Polarized Attitude

209

.013 (.010)

.024

-.021 (.014)

-.030

-.011^

.021 (.026)

.004

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

47

.078 (.021)

162

.102 (.018)

Yes (+1)
No (-1)

5
204

-.037 (.057)
.101 (.019)

^

.003
-.007

.019 (.018)
*

-.020

*

-.187 (.096)
.025 (.017)

*

-.030

*

-.042

**

**

-.049

**

-.051

**

Inference Moderators
Processing Motivation
(depth)

High (+1)
No manip. (0)
Low (-1)

6
193
10

.043 (.070)
.098 (.018)
.086 (.058)

-.003

-.281 (.109)
.024 (.018)
.189 (.086)

Processing Motivation
(involvement)

High (+1)
No manip. (0)
Low (-1)

6
195
8

.092 (.065)
.098 (.019)
.063 (.065)

.003

.118 (.094)
.016 (.017)
.004 (.094)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

88
121

.081 (.022)
.105 (.019)

-.011

.060 (.025)
-.010 (.022)

*

Representativeness
(misattribution)

Present (+1)
Absent (-1)

7

.066 (.063)

-.006

-.364 (.110)

***

202

.097 (.018)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

127
82

.087 (.020)
.109 (024)

.006

.045 (.021)
-.023 (.027)

*

.004

Relevance
(disposition)

High (+1)
No manip. (0)
Low (-1)

8
193
8

.051 (.082)
.1004 (.019)
.009 (.082)

.005

.209 (.091)
.024 (.018)
-.209 (.090)

**

.046

.016

.039
-.080

.019

*
***

.011
-.093

***

.030 (.018)

Exploratory Methodological Moderators

-.002
**

.055

**

92
Year

209

.009 (.009)

-.004

-.015 (.014)

.006

-.008

USA (+1)

114

.098 (.023)

-.004

.018 (.023)

-.0001

-.006

Non-USA (-1)

95

.095 (.025)

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

65
144

.072 (.035)
.102 (.019)

-.005

-.022 (.028)
.035 (.019)

-.036^

-.041

Number of measures (M)

209

.014 (.017)

.015

-.011 (.017)

-.019

-.001

Number of measures (Y)

209

-.014 (.014)

-.017

.012 (.017)

.024

.007

176

.087 (.019)

.016 (.019)

-.008

33

.126 (.032)

Country

Publication Status

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

.023 (.026)

-.012

^

-.026

.033 (.039)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1
Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2
Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.
3
The Total Effect from is provided as a benchmark.
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Table 7.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

44

.019 (.016)

.024

-.023 (.035)

-.116

-.032

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

23

.060 (.026)

.112

.092 (.055)

.035

.078

21

.005 (.017)

High (+1)
No Manip (0)

1

-.019 (.171)

42

.022 (.016)

.119 (.038)

Low (-1)

1

.074 (.171)

.221 (.234)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

14
30

.016 (.026)
.033 (.026)

-.119

.136 (.059)
.090 (.053)

Representativeness
(misattribution)

Present (+1)
Absent (-1)

2
42

.058 (.180)
.022 (.015)

.005

-.305 (.248)
.121 (.038)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

41
3

.022 (.016)
.036 (.089)

-.072

.117 (.039)
.054 (.138)

Attention

.131 (.053)
Inference Moderators

Processing Motivation
(depth)

Year

-.010

-.287 (.234)

44

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
-.012 (.026)
-.014
.020 (.046)

^

-.055

^

-.067

.190

^

.098

-.152

*

-.139

-.036

-.068

-.119

-.163

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

38
6

.032 (.013)
.-.026 (.027)

-.016

.101 (.043)
.149 (.077)

.070

.069

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

6
38

.025 (.071)
.023 (.016)

-.122

.019 (.109)
.125 (.039)

.013

-.060

Number of measures (M)

44

.004 (.025)

-.083

-.004 (.04)

-.025

-.043

Number of measures (Y)

44

-.002 (.023)

-.037

-.011 (.042)

.017

-.057

28

.048 (.024)

.078 (.045)

-.116

Type of dependent
measure

Attitude (+1)

.075

-.093

*

*

^

94
(attitude)

Non-Attitude (1)

16

.006 (.019)

.167 (.052)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1
Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2
Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.
3
The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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Table 8.
Indirect and Direct Mediation Effects for the Standard Paradigm, Adjusted for Measurement Error in M and Correlated Error
between M and Y (rMM = .8 and e = f = .34; see Appendix D for adjustment method details).
Indirect
Direct
Indirect > Direct
Indirect > 0 Direct > 0
Adjustment for Potential Bias
(median) (median)
(percent)
(percent)
(percent)

None

Proximal effect sizes (N=143)
.08
.12
47%

80%

71%

Measurement Error in M

.11

.07

61%

80%

64%

Correlated Error between M and Y

.03

.18

32%

67%

78%

Both

.05

.15

37%

67%

73%

None

Distal effect sizes (N=31)
.03
.25

13%

74%

90%

Measurement Error in M

.04

.29

13%

68%

97%

Correlated Error between M and Y

-.02

.31

7%

42%

97%

Both

-.03

.34

7%

42%

97%
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S1

S2

Subjective
Ease
I2

Few vs. Many

Dependent
Measure

I1
Salience Moderators (S)
Range
Attention
Polarized Attitude

Inference Moderators (I)
Processing Motivation
Representativeness
Relevance
Polarized Attitude

Figure 1. Theoretical organization of moderators of ease-of-retrieval effect.
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Figure 2. The mediation model of the ease-of-retrieval effect.
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A. Standard Paradigm, Proximal
30
25

%

20
15
10
5
0

B. Moderated Paradigm, Proximal
30
25

%

20
15
10
5
0

Figure 3. Distribution of proximal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated paradigms (B).
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A. Standard Paradigm, Distal
30
25

%

20
15
10
5
0

B. Moderated Paradigm, Distal
30
25

%

20
15
10
5
0

Figure 4. Distribution of distal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated paradigms (B).
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A. Before Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)

B. After Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)

C. With Contours (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)

Figure 5. Funnel plots for the standard (left), moderated (middle), and combined (right) for
proximal effect sizes (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel depicts the confidence interval for the
sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the
confidence interval after applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha
contours (white indicates nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of
funnel p < .01) assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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A. Before Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)

B. After Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)

C. With Contours (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)

Figure 6. Funnel plots for the standard paradigm (left), moderated (middle), and combined
(right) for distal effect sizes (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel depicts the confidence interval for
the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the
confidence interval after applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha
contours (white indicates nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of
funnel p < .01) assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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errM

Confound
(C)

errY

Figure 7. Mediation model that includes measurement error (errM) and correlated error due to an
unmeasured confounding variable (C).
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A. Standard Paradigm (unadjusted)
1

0.8

0.6

Direct Effect

0.4

0.2

0
-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

Indirect Effect (Mediation by Subjective Ease)

D. Standard Paradigm
(adjusted, both measurement error for M and correlated error for M and Y )
1

0.8

0.6

Direct Effect

0.4

0.2

0
-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

Indirect Effect (Mediation by Subjective Ease)

Figure 8. Scatterplots of unadjusted (Panel A) and adjusted (Panel B) indirect and direct effects
for all standard paradigm observations in the triplets dataset (solid markers for proximal effect
sizes, gray markers for distal effect sizes). (Note: Four outlier observations are not plotted, 2
proximal and 2 distal; however, these observations are included in the analyses reported in Table
8.)
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Appendix A
Example e-mail for reaching out to authors
Dear []:
[Co-author] and I are conducting a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect. You have been a contributor to this
literature, so we hope you can help us. Attached is a spreadsheet with the data we have been able to abstract from
your publications.
The data we seek are correlations (as reported or computed from other reported measures) between the few-many
manipulation (X), the manipulation check on subjective difficulty (M), and the dependent measure of interest
(Y). For your attached study, this would be []. In addition to examining the basic effect, we are examining the
mediation of the effect by subjective difficulty, which is why we need three correlations for each observation.
Importantly, we are separating reported results into experimental conditions that the authors present as conceptual
replications of the original effect reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the standard paradigm -- and conditions in
which the authors change the standard paradigm in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing
attenuation or reversal. Thus, we often get two or more observations from a single experiment.
Currently, we have data from 142 articles and dissertations, 258 experiments, and 539 observations. It is no surprise
that the basic effect in the standard paradigm conditions is very robust, and this effect is reliably reduced or reversed
in the non-standard conditions. However, there is a significant level of heterogeneity in the effect sizes, and we
hope to identify the factors that do and do not contribute to this variation. Also, we hope to explore the role of
subjective difficulty as a mediator of the effect. Regarding the latter, we have r(XY) for 85% of the observations
and r(XM) for 94% of the observations, but for r(MY) only 21% of observations.
What do we need from you? First, please review how we have separated the conditions of your experiments into
standard and non-standard paradigms and confirm that they are consistent with your interpretation of your
manipulations. Second, we need the missing correlations. We are happy to do whatever we can to make this easier
for you. Below are some options.
OPTION 1: Send us the original data. We will only use it for the purpose of computing the correlations we need.
OPTION 2: Hire a student research assistant to do this work under your direction. We reimburse you for this
expense (up to some reasonable amount). Also, we would be happy to work with this student via phone/Skype.
OPTION 3: Do it yourself. Just fill in the yellow cells in the attached spreadsheet. Alternatively, we have designed
a website that assists in this process. It is preloaded with the data we already have, and it has effect size
"calculators" to make the task easier. Of course, the RA in Option 2 might also want to use the website.
OPTION 4: Some combination of the above, or some other process that occurs to you.
Of course, if you have unpublished experiments in your "file drawer" (new or old), we would love to have the
correlations from those experiments.
Please let us know if you can help. Thanks in advance.
Regards
[Authors]
Note: While we used the phrase “very robust” to describe the effect when reaching out to authors, we caution
against using this language as a template for future meta-analyses so as not to bias authors. It is possible that this
language could encourage more individuals to send data, but it is also possible it may affect whether individuals
with successful or unsuccessful filedrawer studies are willing to respond.
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Figure A1. Example sheet sent to authors to request missing data and to verify our interpretation
of their studies.
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Appendix B
Table of Effect Sizes
Table B1. List of proximal studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database –proximal effect sizes.
Paper

Exp

Source1

Topic Retrieved

Difficulty
Question2

Few

Many

DV

Misattribution3

XY Std

XY Mod

Aarts & Dijksterhuis
(1999)
Aarts & Dijksterhuis
(1999)

1

J

Biking instances

A

3

8

N

r = .23, N = 78

-

2

J

Biking instances

B

3

8

Frequency of
usage estimate
Frequency of
usage stimate

N

r = .30, N = 51

r = -.09, N
= 49

Aladjem (2010)

1

D

Reasons to drive a BMW

B

1

10

N

r = .32, N = 69.5

r = -.30, N
= 69.5

Aladjem (2010)

2

D

Reasons why Dutch team would win
Soccer World

B

1,2

7, 10

N

r = .30, N = 77.5

r = -.44, N
= 77.5

Aladjem (2010)

3

D

Pro/Con reasons in favor of
presidential ticket

A

1

10

N

r = .32, N = 65

r = -.31, N
= 74

Alter & Balcetis
(2010)

3

J

Reasons NY (C1) vibrant and
exciting/ (C2) dirty and dangerous

N

2

10

Attitudeassertion effect
(enjoyment of
listing task);
attitude
Attitudeassertion effect
(enjoyment of
listing task);
attitude
Attitudeassertion effect
(enjoyment of
listing task);
attitude
Attitude towards
NYC

N

-

Angle (2012)

pilot

D

Behaviors engaged in that
demonstrate university spirit

N

4

12

N

Armitage (2007)

1

J

Instances of taking stairs instead of
elevator

A

3

8

N

r = .23, N = 83

-

Armitage (2007)

2

J

Instances of volunteering to help
others

A

3

8

Choice of
Universityrelated lottery
Frequency
estimate of
stairs; attitude
towards stairs,
behavioral
intention
towards stairs
Frequency
estimate of
volunteering;

C1: r = .34, N =
30, C2: r = .25, N
= 30
r = .29, N = 61

N

r = .27, N = 77

-

-
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Ask et al. (2012)

1

J

(C1) Truth/ (C2) lie clues

B

2

6

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

1

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

A

2

10

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

3

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

A

2

10

Bares (2007)

1

D

Shy/mean/friendly/nice/books liked

A

1, 3

5,8

Bares (2007)

F

D

Shy/mean/friendly/nice/books liked

A

3

8

attitude,
behavioral
intentions,
behavioral
control,
subjective norm
Credibility
judgment

N

# of Feeling
Related Reasons
used to justify
evaluation of
book; trust in
feelings
reliance on
feelings to make
choice
How much do
you like being
friendly
(shy/friendly);
How much do
people like you
(mean/nice);
How much do
you like reading
(book);
frequency

N

C1: r = .33 N =
42, C2: r = .31 N
= 42
r = .26, N = 59

-

N

r = .18, N = 97

-

N

r = .30, N = 10; r
= .02, N = 10; r =
-.11, N = 11; r =
.62, N = 10; r =
.05, N = 10; r = .25, N = 10

How much do
you like being

N

r = -.05, N = 44; r
= .10, N = 44; r =

r = -.15, N
= 10; r = .05, N = 9,
r = .15, N
= 11, r =
0, N = 10;
r = -.30, N
= 10; r =
.06, N =
10; r =
.15, N =
10; r = .40, N =
9; r = .33,
N = 9; r =
.09, N =
10; r = .11, N =
10; r =
.04, N =
10; r =
.14, N =
10; r = .03, N =
10
-

-

109

Bartels & Urminsky
(2011)

3

J

Reasons identity would remain
stable

B

2

12

Belli et al. (1998)

1

J

Specific events experienced when 57 and 8-10 years old

A

4

12

Belli et al. (1998)

2

J

Specific events experienced when 57 and 8-10 years old

N

4

12

Bianchi et al. (2009)

3

J

Positive aspects of the group the
Germans

N

3

12

Biswas, Keller, &
Burman (2012)

1

J

Reasons car might have starting
problems

A

4

12

Biswas, Keller, &
Burman (2012)

2

J

Reasons car might have starting
problems (C1) high need for closure,
(C2) low need for closure

A

4

12

Biswas, Keller, &
Burman (2012)

3

J

Performance-related problems of
music CD (C1) neutral exp (C2)
negative exp

A

4

12

Biswas, Keller, &
Burman (2012)

4

J

Reasons car might have starting
problems (C1) cue absent (C2) cue
present

N

4

12

friendly
(shy/friendly);
How much do
people like you
(mean/nice);
How much do
you like reading
(book)
Connectedness
to future self
Judgment of
childhood
memory
Judgment of
childhood
memory
Ingroup
projection
ratings; social
projection rating
Probability of 5year old used
Volkswagen
failing
Probability of 5year old used
Volkswagen
failing
Probability of
typical music
CD from same
company having
performancerelated problems
within 6 months
of purchase
Probability of 5year old used
Volkswagen
failing; number
of possible
reasons for a car
to have starting
problems

-.01, N = 39; r =
.18, N = 39

N

r = .23, N = 97

-

N

r = .18, N = 152

-

N

r = .21, N = 107

-

N

r = .35, N = 66

-

N

r = .39, N = 41

-

N

C1: r = .43, N =
39

C2: r =
.08, N =
39

N

C1: r = .32 N =
45

C2: r = .28 N = 49

C2

C1: r = .28 N =
50

C2: r = .27 N = 50
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Bohner et al. (2002)

1

J

Brinol, Petty, &
Tormala (2006)

1

J

Broemer (2001)

1

J

Bulbul (2007)

4b

Carter & Dunning
(2008)

Reasons of personal behaviors that
would increase/decrease risk of
rape; (C1) no pres + low RMA
+decr (C2) time pres + low RMA +
decr (C3) no pres + low RMA + incr
(C4) time pres + low RMA + incr
(C5) time pres + high RMA + incr
(C6) no pres + high RMA +decr ,
(C7) time pres + high RMA + decr,
(C8) no pres + high RMA + incr
Reasons in favor of comprehensive
exams; (C1) ease is good, (C2) ease
is bad

B

2

6

Vulnerability to
sexual assault

N

C1: r = .25 N =
49, C2: r = .16 N
= 32, C3: r = .17
N = 34 C4: r =
.19 N = 42, C5: r
= .07 N = 40

C6: r = .10 N =
37, C7: r
= .08 N =
42, C8: r
= -.30 N =
37

N

2

10

N

C1: r = .35 N =
30, C2: r = .38 N
= 30

-

(C1) Desired/ (C2) undesired end
states in relationship

B

5

10

Attitude
favorability
towards senior
comprehensive
exams
Interpersonal
closeness

N

-

D

Reasons why or why not to purchase

A

2

10

N

1

U

(C1, C3, C5) Positive/ (C2, C4)
negative attributes about (C1, C2,
C3) George Bush/ (C3, C5) Obama;
(C1, C2, C5) Democrat or (C3, C4)
Republican

A

2

8

Assortment size
(small or large)
preference
Evaluation of
President;
judged success
of presidency

C1: r = .29 N =
52, C2: r = .21 N
= 52
r = .28, N = 42

N

C5: r = .03, N =
42, C4: r = .31 N
=7

Carter & Dunning
(2009)

2

U

A

2

7

Attitude
Certainty

N

C1: r = .11 N =
19

Carter & Dunning
(2011)

3

U

Arguments in favor of/against
constitutional amendment banning
gay marriage (C1) against + against,
(C2) against + originally for, (C3)
for + originally against
Factors that would help Obama in
2012 for (C1) democrat or (C2)
republican

C3: r = .32 N = 7,
C2: r = .01 N =
29, C1: r
= .21 N =
28
C2: r - .32
N = 10,
C3 = r = .06 N = 39

A

2

8

N

C1: r = .02, N =
135

C2: r = .12 N = 45

Carter & Dunning
(2009)

4

U

(C1) charitable or (C2) Neutral /
introverted behaviors

A

2

12

N

C1: r = .07 N =
26

C2: r = .41 N = 23

Carter & Dunning
(2009)

5

U

(C1) charitable or (C2)
Neutral/introverted behaviors

A

2

10

Subjective
Likelihood;
percentage of
popular vote for
Obama
Trait rating,
relative trait
rating
Self-rated Trait
rating, relative
trait rating

N

C1: r = .06 N =
110

C2: r =
.09 N =
101

-
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Carter & Sanna
(2008)

2

J

(C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect selfpresentation strategies

B

3

12

Caruso (2008)

1a

J

Assertive

A

2

8

Caruso (2008)

1b

J

Assertive

A

2

8

Caruso (2008)

2

J

Creative

A

2

6

Caruso (2008)

3

J

Unsafe feeling

A

2

6

Caruso et al. (2011)

1

U

examples in which did not have
enough money

B

2

6

Chang (2010)

1

J

Consequences of disease

A

2

5

Chang (2010)

2

J

A

3

7

Chang (2010)

3

J

Number of ways to prevent
hemorrhoids
Consequences of disease (C1)
solutions (C2) consequences

A

2

5

Chang (2010)

4

J

Consequences of disease: (C1) tinea
pedis or (C2) peridontal

N

2

5

Cheng (2005)

3

D

Good things about being an Asian
American

N

3

12

Corby & Homa
(2011)*
Corby & Homa
(2011)*
Cutright, Bettman, &
Fitzsimons (2013)
Cutright, Bettman, &
Fitzsimons (2013)
Danziger, Moran, &
Rafaely (2006)

1

J

A

6

2

J

A

Pilot

J

1

J

1

J

Recent/childhood examples of
assertive, creative, optimism
Assertive, friendly, optimism,
creative
Things in life over which have
complete control
Things in life over which have
complete control
Reasons in favor of proposal of
changing number of school years in
Israel; (C1, C2) high experiential or
(C3, C4) low experiential

2

J

DeMarree et al.
(2012)

Times tried very hard to achieve
something

Judgment of
childhood
memory
Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Creativity
Safety

N
N

C1: r = .48 N =
16, C2: r = .59 N
= 16
r = .43, N = 30

-

N

r = .13, N = 57

N

r = .24, N = 48

N

r = .19, N = 38

Satisfaction
with personal
finances
Perceived
severity
Perceived
efficacy
Public Service
Announcement
effectiveness
Severity of
disease

N

r = .05, N = 99

r = -.09, N
= 30
r = -.24, N
= 57
r = -.13, N
= 47
r = -.39, N
= 38
-

N

r = .28 N = 47

-

N

r = .21 N = 95

-

N

C1: r = .32 N =
48

C2: r =
.08 N = 49

N

-

N

r = -.17, N = 108

12

attitude towards
being Asian
American
Self-rated traits

C1: r =
.09 N =
99.5, C2: r
= -.24 N =
99.5
-

N

-

-

6

12

Self-rated traits

N

-

-

N

2

10

N

r = .37, N = 29.6

-

N

2

10

N

r = .38, N = 59

(C1, C3)
B, (C2,
C4) A

2

8

N

C1: r = .16 N =
66, C2: r = .18 N
= 79, C3: r = .25
N = 84

C4: r = .21, N =
75

A

4

10

Perceptions of
control
Perceptions of
control
Evaluation of
proposal to
change number
of school years
in Israel from 12
to 11
Persistence on
anagrams

N

r = .26, N = 64

-
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Demotta (2012)

3

D

Reasons organization was
competent
Reasons for choosing vacation
package: (C1) on-line + high inv
(C2) memory + low (C3) on-line +
low (C4) memory + high

A

2

8

Deval (2010)

1

D

Deval (2010)

2

Dijksterhuis, Macrae,
& Haddock (1999)

Competence of
organization
Attitude towards
vacation
package;
confidence (C1,
C3)
Attitude towards
3D HDTV;
confidence (C1,
C3)

N

r = .28, N = 128

-

N

2

8

N

C1: r = .34 N =
44, C2: r = .36 N
= 41

N

C1: r = .35 N =
46, C2: r = .32 N
= 44

Judges’ ratings
of
Stereotypicality
in target
portrayals
Judged memory
quality;
vividness
Judged memory
quality

N

C1: r = .72, N =
31

N

r = .32, N = 93

C3: r = .08 N =
44, C4: r
= -.22 N =
43
C3: r =
.14 N =
42, C4: r
= .05 N =
43
C2: r =
.46, N =
31, C3: r
= -.50, N
= 31
-

D

Reasons for choosing TV (C1) online + high need for closure (C2)
memory + low (C3) on-line + low
(C4) memory + high

N

1

10

1

J

Traits on which men and women
reliably differ; (C1) low, (C2)
medium, (C3) high

A

3

8

Echterhoff & Hirst
(2006)

1

J

Memory of experiences on NYE

A

4

12

Echterhoff & Hirst
(2006)

2

J

A

4

12

Eibach, Libby, &
Gilovich (2003)
Etcheverry, Le, &
Hoffman (2013)

4

J

B

3

12

3

J

(C1) no shock, (C2) attenuated
shock, (C3) high shock Memories of
September 11th
Things about you changed since
high school
Reasons friend is satisfied

N

C3: r = .07 N = 69

Judgment of
self-change
Level of
approval;
perceived
relationship
satisfaction
Willingness to
invest
Willingness to
invest
Course Ratings

N

C1: r = .28 N =
73, C2: r = .41 N
= 73
r = .33, N = 80

B

3

8

N

r = .32, N = 44

-

Florack & Zoabi
(2003)*
Florack & Zoabi
(2003)*
Fox (2006)

1

J

Reasons for/against investment

N

1

3

N

-

-

2

J

Reasons for/against investment

A

1

3

N

-

-

1

J

N

2

10

Gawronski,
Bodenhausen, &
Banse (2005)
Gawronski,
Bodenhausen, &
Banse (2005)

4

J

Ways in which course could be
improved
(C1) Introverted/ (C2) extroverted
exemplars

N

r = .28, N = 58

-

N

3

10

Outgroup
extroversion

N

-

10

Ingroup
Extroversion;
outgroup
extraversion

N

C1: r = .50 N =
16, C2: r = .49 N
= 16
C1: r = .21 N =
35, C2: r = .29 N
= 35

5

J

Students high in (C1) introversion/
(C2) extroversion

A

3

-

-
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Gomillion (2012)

1

U

Ways in which partner facilitates
academic goals

A

4

12

Perceived
partner
instrumentality;
academic ability
test
Likelihood of
being assaulted

N

r = -.11 N = 53, r
= .03 N = 54

-

Grayson & Schwarz
(1999)

1

J

Behaviors that could
increase/decrease risk of assault

B

4

12

N

r = .48 N = 29; r
= .21 N = 29

7

Perceived risk

N

r = .29 N = 30

2

5

N

r = .24 N = 43.5

B

2

8

N

r = .21 N = 40

Reasons in favor of introduction of
new quarterly surgery fee

B

2

5

Evaluation of
surgery fee
Self-rated
Assertiveness
Evaluation of
surgery fee

C2

C1: r = .28 N =
21.5

J

Number of kitchen tools

B

4

12

N

r = .27, N = 33

2

J

Reasons in favor of expansion of
Mannheim airport

B

2

6

N

r = .20, N = 44

r = -.14 N
= 30, r = .22 N = 25
r = -.44 N
= 29
r = -.19 N
= 43.5
r = -.39 N
= 40
C2: r = .43 N =
21.5
r = -.28, N
= 33
r = -.11, N
= 44

Grayson & Schwarz
(1999)
Greifeneder & Bless
(2007)
Greifeneder & Bless
(2007)
Greifeneder & Bless
(2007)

2

J

B

3

1

J

B

2

J

Behaviors that could increase risk of
assault
Reasons in favor of introduction of
new quarterly surgery fee
Assertiveness

3

J

Greifeneder & Bless
(2008)
Greifeneder & Bless
(2008)

1

Greifeneder & Keller
(2012)

1

J

B

2

6

N

Greifeneder & Keller
(2012)

2

J

B

2

6

Greifeneder et al.
(2011a)

1

J

Reasons in favor of airport
extension: (C1) promotion (C2)
middle (C3) prevention
Reasons in favor of airport
extension (C1) promotion (C2)
middle (C3) prevention
Unfair aspects of the university
admission process

B

2

4

C1: r = .24 N =
39.5, C2: r = .11
N = 39.5
C1: r = .33 N =
19.67, C2: r = .18
N = 19.67
r = .46 N = 23

C3: r = .09 N =
39.5
C3: r = .09 N =
19.67
-

Greifeneder et al.
(2011a)

2

J

Unfair aspects about orientation
exam for (C1) certain or (C2)
uncertain

A

2

4

N

C1: r = .23 N =
47.5

C2: r = .23 N =
47.5

Greifeneder et al.
(2011a)

3

J

Unfair aspects about orientation
exam (C1) certainty (C2) control
(C3) uncertainty

A

2

4

N

C1: r = .39 N =
32.67, C2: r = .16
N = 32.67

C3: r = .04 N =
32.67

Greifeneder et al.
(2011b)

1

J

Aspects of trust game seeming
unfair as senders (C1) low
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty

A

2

4

N

C1: r = .34 N =
30

C2: r = .11 N = 30

Evaluation of
kitchen tools
Attitude towards
airport
extension
Evaluation of
airport
extension
Evaluation of
airport
extension
Procedural
justice; attitude
towards the
ZVS
Procedural
justice;
organizational
attractiveness
Procedural
justice;
organizational
attractiveness
Fairness
perception

N
N
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Greifeneder et al.
(2011b)

2

J

Aspects of trust game seeming
unfair as senders (C1) low
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty
Reasons to (C1, C3) like/ (C2, C4)
dislike Tony Blair with (C1, C2)
low or (C3, C4) high interest in
politics

A

1

3

Trusting
behavior

N

C1: r = .34 N =
27.5

Haddock (2002)

1

J

Haddock, Rothman,
& Schwarz (1996)

1

Haddock et al. (1999)

C2: r = .13 N =
27.5
C3: r = .11 N =
27.5, C4: r
= -.06 N =
27.5
-

A

2

5

Evaluation of
Tony Blair

N

C1: r = .16 N =
23, C2: r = .38 N
= 23

J

Reasons (C1) for or (C2) against
doctor-assisted suicide

A

3

7

Attitude
strength

N

1

J

Reasons (C1, C3) for or (C2, C4)
against doctor-assisted suicide with
moderate (C1, C2) or extreme (C3,
C4) attitude

A

3

7

Attitude
certainty

N

C1: r = .14 N =
30,
C2: r = .41, N =
27
C1: r = .36 N =
20, C2: r = .29 N
= 20

Haddock et al. (1999)

2

J

Reasons (C1, C3) for or (C2, C4)
against doctor-assisted suicide with
(C1, C2) high diag or (C3, C4) low
diag

A

3

7

Attitude
certainty

C3/C4

C1: r = .40 N =
19.5, C2: r = .13
N = 19.5

Hansen & Wänke
(2008)

2

J

A

2

6

Attitude towards
DNA databases

N

C1: r = .34, N =
31.5

Hansen & Wänke
(2008)

3

J

Arguments against implementation
of federal DNA databases; (C1)
discrepant or (C2) congruent
(C1, C3) Pro/ (C2, C4) Con for
voting on Internet

A

2

8

Attitude towards
Internet voting

N

C1: r = .32 N =
37.5, C2: r = .18
N = 37.5

Hermann,
Leonardelli, & Arkin
(2002)*
Hermann,
Leonardelli, & Arkin
(2002)*
Hermann,
Leonardelli, & Arkin
(2002)*
Hirt, Kardes, &
Markman (2004)*
IJzerman & Semin
(2010)

1

J

A

2

8

Self-esteem

N

-

2

J

A

2

12

Self-esteem

N

-

-

3

J

A

8

20

Self-esteem

N

-

-

1

J

Events in your life that led you to
feel confident about ability to
perform
Events in your life that led you to
feel confident about ability to
perform
Events in your life that led you to
feel confident about ability to
perform
NFC Teams, Sitcomes

C1: r =
.04 N =
20, C2: r
= -.12 N =
20
C3: r = .35 N =
19.5, C4: r
= -.20 N =
19.5
C2: r = .18, N =
31.5
C3: r = .29 N =
37.5, C4: r
= -.07 N =
37.5
-

A

2

8

N

-

-

2

J

Similarities

A

3

10

Winning
probability
similarities

N

-

r = -.19, N
= 84
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Janssen, Muller, &
Greifeneder (2011)

1

J

Number of fair aspects of contact
with company: (C1) experienced +
certain (C2) inexperienced +
uncertain (C3) inexperienced +
certain (C4) experienced + uncertain

B

1

4

Procedural
justice

N

C1: r = .15 N =
130.75

Kadous, Krische, &
Sedor (2006)
Kadous, Krsiche, &
Sedor (2006)

1

J

Reasons for failure

A

2

12

Forecasts

N

r = .20, N = 39

C2: r = .07 N =
130.75,
C3: r = .08 N =
130.75,
C4: r = .14 N =
130.75
-

2

J

Reasons financial performance
might not be as positive

A

2

10

Forecasts

N

r = 0, N = 42

-

Keller & Bless (2009)

1

J

B

2, 3

7, 9

Affect duration

N

C1: r = .32 N =
20, C2: r = .44 N
= 26

Kivetz & Zheng
(2006)*

2

J

N

2

10

N

-

pilot

J

A

2

10

Choice of vice
option over
virtue option
Feeling guilty

C3: r = .02 N =
27, C4: r
= .05 N =
24
-

Kivetz & Zheng
(2006)*

N

-

-

Kühnen (2010)

1

J

(C1) High faith in intuition,
unrelated; (C2) high faith in
intuition, related; (C3) low faith in
intuition, unrelated; (C4) low faith
in intuition, related
Examples in which yielded to vice
instead of virtual /overcame a vice
for a virtue
Examples in which yielded to vice
instead of virtual /overcame a vice
for a virtue
Biking instances; (C1) low accuracy
+ manip first, (C2) low accuracy +
manip second, (C3) high accuracy +
manip first (C4) high accuracy +
manip second

B, A

5

15

Frequency of
biking

N

C1: r = .57, N =
29

Kühnen (2010)

2

J

Assertiveness

(C1) B,
(C2) A

2

8

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

C1: r = .18, N =
37.5

Kühnen (2010)

3

J

Arguments in favor of surgery fee;
(C1, C2) attribution absent, (C3, C4)
attribution present

(C1, C3)
B, (C2,
C4) A

2

5

Attitude towards
surgery fee

C3/C4

C1: r = .46, N =
24

Kühnen (2010)

4

J

Attributes on which men and
women differ

(C1) B,
(C2) A

2

12

Stereotyping
(difference in
percentage of

N

C1: r = .26, N =
45

C2: r = .52 N =29,
C3: r = .35, N =
27, C4: r
= -.30 N =
27
C2: r = .30, N =
29
C2: r = .32, N =
24, C3: r
= -.32 N =
23, C4: r
= -.45, N
= 23
C2: r = .30, N =
46
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each sex had
certain
masculine or
feminine traits)
Florida State
University
connect score
Internal
motivation to
respond without
prejudice;
feelings of
acceptance by
outgroup
Proportion of
world’s animals
feel obliged to
show moral
concern for
Proportion of
world’s animals
feel obliged to
show moral
concern for
Self-positivity
bias Reduction

Kunstman et al.
(2013)

2

J

Felt accepted by outgroup

B

2

10

Kunstman et al.
(2013)

3

J

Felt accepted by outgroup

B

2

10

Laham (2013)

1

J

Nonhuman animals they feel
morally obligated to show concern
for

A

3

15

Laham (2013)

2

J

Nonhuman animals they feel
morally obligated to show concern
for

A

3

15

Lai & Kuo (2007)

1

J

Piracy-related behaviors

B

1

5

Lee (2005)

2

J

Benefits or difficulties of work

B

3

8

Work-life
conflict

Lemay, Clark, &
Feeney (2007)
Menon & Raghubir
(2003)

3

J

A

2

8

1

J

Things done to help relationship
partner in past 7 days
Aspects to recall from Micron ad

A

2

8

Menon & Raghubir
(2003)

2

J

Aspects to recall from Micron ad

A

2

8

Menon & Raghubir
(2003)

3

J

Aspects to recall from Micron ad;
(C1) task difficult, feedback after;
(C2) task easy, feedback after, (C3)
task easy, feedback before (C4) task
difficult, feedback before

A

2

8

Partner
responsiveness
Recommendatio
n likelihood for
personal
computer brand
Purchase and
recommendatio
n intention
Purchase and
recommendatio
n intention

N

r = .33, N = 35

-

N

r = .22, N = 119

-

N

r = .38, N = 39

-

N

r = .31, N = 37

-

N

-

N

C1: r = .52 N
=30, C2: r = .17
N = 30
r = .28 N = 68

N

r = .17, N = 151

-

N

r = .34, N = 133

-

C2

C1: r = .13, N =
46

C1/C4

C1: r = .35 N =
26, C2: r = .45 N
= 26, C3: r = .41
N = 26

C2: r = .38, N =
46
C4: r = .59, N =
26

-
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Menon & Raghubir
(2003)

4

J

Aspects to recall from Micron ad;
(C1) load-difficult, (C2) load-no
info, (C3) no load-difficult
Negative autobiographical events
before age 10

A

4

12

Merckelbach et al.
(2001)

1

J

N

3

9

Nestler (2010)

1

J

Counterfactual thoughts

A

2

10

Nestler (2010)

2

J

Counterfactual thoughts

A

2

10

Novemsky et al.
(2007)
Novemsky et al.
(2007)
Novemsky et al.
(2007)

2

J

B

2

10

3

J

Reasons for picking a Microwave
oven or digital camera
Reasons for picking a camera

B

2

10

4

J

Reasons for picking a Microwave
oven

B

2

10

O’Brien (2013)

2

J

(C1) Happy/ (C2) Unhappy
Experiences in Past, (C3) Happy/
(C4) Unhappy Experiences in Future

B

3

12

O’Brien (2012)

1

U

Good aspects of (C1) material/ (C2)
experiential good purchase

A

2

Ofir (2000)

2

J

A

Ofir (2000)

3

J

Ofir (2000)

4

J

Number of fault reasons; (C1) tree
1, (C2) tree 2, (C3) tree 3
Number of specific failure reasons;
(C1) tree 1, drivers; (C2) tree 2,
drivers; (C3) tree 1, mechanics, (C4)
tree 2, mechanics
Number of specific causal reasons

Ofir et al. (2008)

1a

J

Ofir et al. (2008)

pilot

J

Ofir et al. (2008)

2

J

Ofir et al. (2008)

3

J

Purchase and
recommendatio
n intention
Agreement that
have repressed
many of their
childhood
memories
Belief
perseverance
Belief
perseverance
Choice deferral

C1/C3
N

C1: r = .35 N =
36, C2: r = .22, N
= 36
r = -.30, N = 52

C3: r = .45, N =
16
-

N

r = .34, N = 40

-

N

r = .50, N = 47

-

N

r = .14, N = 289

-

Compromise
Effect incidence
Compromise
Effect incidence

N

r = .27, N = 180

-

C2

C1: r = .25, N =
111

Future
happiness

N

10

Purchase
satisfaction

N

2

5, 6

N

A

2

5

Proportion of all
other problems
Proportion of all
other problems

C1: r = .37, N =
45, C2: r = .40 N
= 45, C3: r = .37
N = 45
C1: r = -.03 N =
69, C2: r = -.003
N = 59
-

C2: r = .20, N =
111
C4: r =
.01, N =
45

N

-

-

A

1

6

N

-

-

Number of low-priced products sold
at store
Number of low-priced products sold
at store
Number of (C1) low-priced/ (C2)
high-priced products sold at store

A

2

5

N

r = .54, N = 99

-

A

2

9

N

r = .39, N = 134

-

A

2

5

Proportion of all
other problems
Store
expensiveness
Store
expensiveness
Price perception

N

-

Number of low-priced products sold
at store

A

2

5

Store-price
judgment

N

C1: r = .39 N =
76, C2: r = .27, N
= 76
r = .43, N = 51

-

r = -.41, N
= 49
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Oyserman, Fryberg,
& Yoder (2007)

5

J

Ways group and Whites are similar

N

3

8

Self-rated
Similarity to
Whites
Similarity to
Whites
Similarity to
Whites
Comparative
self-positivity

N

r = .32, N = 38.67

-

Oyserman, Fryberg,
& Yoder (2007)
Oyserman, Fryberg,
& Yoder (2007)
Pahl & Eiser (2007)

6

J

Ways group and Whites are similar

N

3

8

N

r = .29, N = 40

-

7

J

Ways group and Whites are similar

N

3

8

N

r = .29, N = 68

-

1

J

Behaviors (C1) you / (C2) a typical
student does in a typical week that
may be harmful to environment

A

2

8

N

C1: r = .06 N =
49.5, C2: r = .23
N = 49.5

-

Park (2004)

1

D

A

1

Park (2004)

2

D

A

Petrocelli & Dowd
(2009)

3

J

Reason for purchase (C1)
compatible prevention (C2)
compatible promotion (C3)
incompatible prevention (C4)
incompatible promotion
Reason for purchase (C1)
compatible interdependent (C2)
compatible independent (C3)
incompatible interdependent (C4)
incompatible independent
If-only statements

10

Product
Evaluation

N

C1: r = .40 N =
26.25, C2: r = .39
N = 26.25

1

10

Product
Evaluation

N

C1: r = .18 N =
34.25, C2: r = .57
N = 34.25

A

4

10

N

r = .27, N = 49

Reasons to go to a (C1) causal or
(C2) fancy restaurant

A

1

5

Severity of
punishment;
deservingness of
punishment;
causality
Willingness-topay

C3: r = .35 N =
26.25, C4:
r = -.30 N
= 26.25
C3: r = .48 N =
34.25, C4:
r = -.42 N
= 34.25
r = -.20, N
= 49

Pocheptsova, Labroo,
& Dhar (2010)

2

J

N

J

Observations that (C1) God can
explain, (C2) observations that can
explain God’s behavior

N

3

10

Perceived value
of Belief in God

N

C1: r = .10 N =
102.5, C2: r = .33
N = 102.5
-

Preston & Epley
(2005)

3

2

J

AIDS-related behaviors (Self)

A

3

5

Risk of AIDS

N

r = .27, N = 50

C1: r = .20 N =
28.5, C2: r
= -.04 N =
28.5
-

Raghubir & Menon
(1998)
Raghubir & Menon
(1998)
Raghubir & Menon
(2005)

3

J

Ways in which HIV is transmitted

A

1

3

Risk of AIDS

N

r = .30, N = 61

-

1

J

(C1) Positive/ (C2) Negative
experiences eating out

A

2

8

Satisfaction
with eating-out
experiences;
open-ended
frequency,
close-ended
frequency,

N

C1: r = .23 N =
47, C2: r = .31 N
= 47

-

-
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Raghubir & Menon
(2005)

2

J

(C1, C3) Positive/ (C2, C4)
Negative experiences eating out (C1,
C2) recently or (C3, C4) distant

A

2

10

Rai & Holyoak
(2010)

1

J

Reasons for employee to take
proposed Trolley action

N

2

7

Roese & Summerville
(2005)

3c

J

A

2

8

Rothman & Hardin
(1997)

1

J

Examples of opportunities in (C1)
Kindness and respect in friendships,
(C2) meeting new friends, (C3) time
spent with romantic partner, (C4)
trust in romantic relationships
Polite/impolite behaviors

A

3

6

dollars spent
eating out,
attitude towards
eating out,
likelihood of
initiating next
eating out,
likelihood of
positive
experience,
likelihood of
negative
experience
Satisfaction
with eating-out
experiences;
open-ended
frequency,
close-ended
frequency,
dollars spent
eating out – sitdown, dollars
spent eating out
fast-food,
attitude towards
eating out,
likelihood of
initiating next
eating out,
likelihood of sitdown,
likelihood of
fast-food
Agreement with
taking proposed
action
Self-rated
Regret

Self-rated
Impolite ratings

N

C1: r = .39 N =
41.75, C2: r = .31
N = 41.75

C3: r = .002 N =
41.75, C4:
r = -.05 N
= 41.75

N

r = .19, N = 124

-

N

C1: r = .01 N =
60, C2: r = .21 N
= 42, C3: r = -.22
N = 50, C4: r =
.01 N = 46
r = .25, N = 54

-

N

r = -.24, N
= 42
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Rothman & Hardin
(1997)

2

J

Assertive/Unassertive

A

3

6

Self-rated
Assertiveness

C3/C4

C1: r = .11, N =
20.75; C2: r =
.21, N = 20.75

Rothman & Hardin
(1997)

3

J

Assertive/Unassertive

A

3

6

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

r = .12, N = 58; r
= .13, N = 63

Rothman & Schwarz
(1998)

1

J

A

3

8

Risk Perception

N

C1: r = .38 N =
18, C2: r = .59 N
= 20, C3: r = .42
N = 19, C4: r =
.28 N = 17

Ruder & Bless (2003)

1

J

Risk-increasing/decreasing factors
for self/avg. man (C1) family history
+ avg man + decr (C2) family
history + avg man + incr (C3) no
family + self + decr (C4) no family
+ self + incr (C5) no family + avg +
decr (C6) no family + avg + incr
(C7) family + self + decr (C8)
family +self + incr
Arguments in favor of reduction in
number of years of education

B

2

6

N

r = .61 N = 24

Ruder & Bless (2003)

3

J

Reasons against highway toll; (C1)
happy + diagnostic (C2) sad +
nondiagnostic (C3) sad + diagnostic
(C4) happy + nondiagnostic

B

2

5

Agreement with
policy for
change in
education
system
Agreement with
policy for
highway toll

C2/C4

C1: r = .37 N =
27.5

Ruder & Bless (2003)

4

J

Arguments in favor of reduction in
number of years of education

B

2

5

N

r = .41 N = 31.5

Ruder & Bless (2003)

F

J

Arguments in favor of reduction in
number of years of education

B

2

6

N

r = .43, N = 24

Agreement with
policy for
highway toll
Agreement with
policy for
change in
education
system

C3: r = .28, N =
42.50; C4:
r = -.17, N
= 42.50;
C5: r = .14, N =
20.75; C6:
r = -.23, N
= 20.75
r = -.17, N
= 58; r = .23, N =
63
C5: r =
.10 N =
21, C6: r
= -.28 N =
18, C7: r
= -.55 N =
20, C8: r
= -.22 N =
23
r = -.33 N
= 26

C2: r = .49 N =
27.5, C3: r
= -.51 N =
27.5, C4: r
= -.46 N =
27.5
r = -.29 N
= 31.5
-
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Sackett (2006)*

6

D

Advantages/disadvantages of
optimistic or pessimistic prediction
errors
Thoughts about (C1) outcome/ (C2)
alternative

N

2

8

Preferences for
predictions

N

-

-

Sanna, Chang, &
Carter (2004)

3

J

B

2

10

outcome
inevitability

N

-

J

Reasons for (C1) successful/ (C2)
unsuccessful task completion

B

5

15

difference in
completion time

N

1

J

A

2

10

Probability
judgment

N

Sanna, Schwarz, &
Stocker (2002)
Sanna, Schwarz, &
Stocker (2002)
Sanna & Schwarz
(2003)

1

J

Thoughts that would have helped
side win; (C1) G win, (C2) British
win
Thoughts of other outcomes

N

2

10

N

2

J

Thoughts of other outcomes

A

2

10

N

r = .49, N = 40

-

1

J

Thoughts about how homecoming
game might have turned out
differently

B

4

12

Probability of
other outcome
Probability of
other outcome
Difference
between actual
and predicted

C1: r = .48 N =
20, C2: r = .58 N
= 20
C1: r = .50 N =
20, C2: r = .55 N
= 20
C1: r = .45 N =
28, C2: r = .57 N
= 29
r = .51, N = 34

Sanna, Parks, Chang,
& Carter (2005)

3

Sanna, Schwarz, &
Small (2002)

C2

C1: r = .57, N =
25

C2: r = .21, N =
28

Sanna & Schwarz
(2004)

1

J

Things that might lead you to do
well on exam

B

3

12

N

-

-

Scarnier (2007)

2

D

Times controlled child’s behavior

A

2

8

N

r = .01, N = 124

-

Shockley (2013)

7

D

Times things went well when stuck
with tradition or routine

N

2

6

N

r = .05, N = 47

-

Schwarz et al. (1991)

1

J

(C1) Assertive
(C2) Unassertive

A

6

12

Study
Completion,
Success
Likelihood
Control (over
ability to
influence child’s
behavior, other
individuals can
control their
children better)
Resistance to
Change Scale;
feelings of
sticking with
tradition
Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

-

Schwarz et al. (1991)

2

J

(C1) Assertive
(C2) Unassertive

A

6

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

C1: r = .35 N =
20,
C2: r = .66, N =
20
C1: r = .17 N =
79,
C2: r = .21, N =
79

-

-
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Schwarz et al. (1991)

3

J

(C1, C3) Assertive
(C2, C4) Unassertive

A

6

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

C3/C4

C1: r = .33 N =
19.5,
C2: r = .39, N =
19.5

Silvera et al. (2005)

2

J

Categories of potential causes of
failure

N

2

8

N

r = .28, N = 76

Simonsohn,
Simmons, & Nelson
(2011)
Sinclair & Carlsson
(2013)

1

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive

N

6

12

Likelihood of
all other
problems
Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

1

J

Typical things done for boys/girls,
things done where felt capable

A

2

10

Occupational
preference

N

Sinha &
Naykankuppam
(2013)
Sinha &
Naykankuppam
(2013)

1

J

Tourist spots in England

A

1

7

Willingness-topay for trip

N

C1: r = -.13 N =
24, C2: r = -.20 N
= 22
r = .13, N = 85; r
= -.28, N = 73; r
= .06, N = 59; r =
.004, N = 54
r = .44, N = 47.33

2

J

Company that makes digital cameras

A

1

7

Purchase
likelihood

N

r = .46, N = 36; r
= .50, N = 36

Sinha &
Naykankuppam
(2013)

3

J

Painters

A

1

4

Willingness-topay

N

r = .50, N =
44.50; r = .50, N
= 44.50

Spielmann,
MacDonald, &
Wilson (2009)
Stephens (2007)

3

J

B

2

10

r = .28 N = 40.5

D

N

3

12

Emotional
attachment to
ex-partner
Likelihood
difference score

N

1

People within their social networks
with whom they could imagine
developing a relationship
Behaviors associated with (C1) AD
(C2) HR

N

Stocker (2006)

3

D

Positive (C1, C3) or Negative (C2,
C4) Thoughts about my (C1, C2) or
others’ (C3, C4) relationships

B

5

25

Modified
Investment
Model Scale
(IMS)

N

Stone & Fernandez
(2011)

1

J

A

2

8

Sunscreen
acquisition

N

Thorisdottir & Jost

1a

J

Distinct times in last year when
spent time in sun but did not wear
sunscreen
Instances in which they felt
threatened

C1: r = .14 N =
59, C2: r = .02 N
= 60
C1: r = -.02, N =
48.5; C2: r = .27,
N = 48.5; C3: r =
.11, N = 48.5; C4:
r = .08, N = 48.50
r = .37 N = 45

N

3

12

Threatened
feeling

N

-

C3: r = .28 N =
19.5,
C4: r = .33, N =
19.5
r = -.19, N
= 86
-

r = -.32, N
= 47.33
r = -.11, N
= 36; r = .58, N =
36
r = -.55, N
= 44.50; r
= -.05, N
= 44.50
r = -.21 N
= 40.5
-

r = -.31 N
= 45
r = -.22, N
= 48
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Thorisdottir & Jost

1b

J

Instances in which they felt
threatened
Reasons against comprehensive
exams

N

3

12

perceived threat

N

-

Tormala, Petty, &
Brinol (2002)

1

J

Tormala, Petty, &
Brinol (2002)

2

Tormala, Petty, &
Brinol (2002)*

r = -.26, N
= 50
r = -.26, N
= 57

N

2

8

N

r = .25, N = 57

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

8

N

r = .25, N = 60.5

r = -.20, N
= 60.5

3

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

A

2

10

N

-

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

1

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

10

N

r = .44, N = 28

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

2

J

Negative thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

10

N

r = .34, N = 38

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty
Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

3

J

Assertiveness

A

2

10

N

r = .23, N = 74

-

4

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

10

N

r = .34, N = 43

-

Tsai & McGill (2011)

1

J

A

2

10

N

3

J

A

2

8

Choice
confidence

C3/C4

C1: r = .42 N =
44.5, C2: r = .25
N = 44.5
C1: r = .34 N =
29.5, C2: r = .37
N = 29.5

-

Tsai & McGill (2011)

Reasons for preferring one camera
over another for (C1) low or (C2)
high construal
Reasons for preferring one movie
over another; (C1, C3) low or (C2,
C4) high construal with (C1, C2) no
attribution or (C3, C4) attribution

Attitude towards
senior
comprehensive
exams
Attitude towards
senior
comprehensive
exams
Attitude towards
senior
comprehensive
exams
Attitude towards
comprehensive
exams
Attitude towards
comprehensive
exams
Self-rated
Assertiveness
Attitude towards
comprehensive
exams;
confidence
Choice
confidence

Tsai & Thomas
(2011)

2

J

A

2

8

Donation
amount

N

Tybout et al. (2005)

1

J

Reasons for donating in support of
polar bears; (C1) abstract or (C2)
concrete
Reasons to drive a Hyundai/BMW

A

1

10

Product
evaluation

N

r = .32, N = 49.5

r = -.29, N
= 49.5

Tybout et al. (2005)

2

J

Reasons to drive a (C3) Saab/(C1)
Hyundai/ (C2) BMW

A

1

10

Product
evaluation

N

C1: r = .30, N =
34.3
C2: r = .40, N =
34.3

C3: r = .46, N =
34.3

C3: r = .09 N =
32.5, C4: r
=0N=
32.5
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Tybout et al. (2005)

4

J

Reasons to drive a BMW

N

1

10

Product
evaluation

N

r = .15, N = 20.5

r = -.05, N
= 20.5

Unkelbach &
Plessner (2007)

2

J

Reasons (C1) for/ (C2) against
sports-stadium

A

2

6

Preference

N

-

Vastfjall, Peters, &
Slovic (2008)
Vaughn (1998)

2

J

N

2

6

Risk perception

N

1

D

Major natural disasters that occurred
in world in last 100 years
Assertive/Unassertive

C1: r = .19 N =
30, C2: r = .38 N
= 27
r = .45, N = 89

A

3

8

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

r = .28, N = 40; r
= -.20, N = 40

Vaughn (1998)

2

D

Positive things seen in Detroit

A

3

7

N

r = .06, N = 55

Vaughn (1998)

3

D

Positive things seen in Detroit

A

3

9

N

r = -.36, N = 29

Vaughn (1999)

1

J

Things that you doing to improve
chances of getting good grades on
finals: (C1) hard + start, (C2) hard +
end, (C3) easy + end, (C4) easy +
start

A

3

8

Desire to live in
Detroit
Evaluation of
Detroit
Self-efficacy

N

C1: r = .25, N =
43.75

Vaughn & Weary
(2002)

1

J

A

2

5

Likelihood
judgment

N

Von Helversen et al.
(2008)
Von Helversen et al.
(2008)

1

J

Reasons event would happen to
them, personally; (C1) no dysphoria
or (C2) dysphoria
Arguments in favor of public transit

A

4

12

N

2

J

(C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive

A

4

11

Attitude about
public transport
Assertiveness

C1: r = .11 N =
45, C2: r = -.04 N
= 50
r = .46, N = 20

r = .35, N
= 40; r =
0, N = 40
r = -.49, N
= 50
R = .24, N
= 30
C2: r = .01, N =
43.75, C3:
r = .08, N
= 43.75,
C4: r = .07, 43.75
-

Walton & Cohen
(2007)*

1

J

A

2

8

Sense could fit
in and succeed

Walton & Cohen
(2007)*
Walton & Cohen
(2007)*

F

J

Friends who had personal
characteristics that would make
them likely to fit in at the school’s
CS department
Skills in domain

A

2

8

P

J

A

2

8

Wänke, Bless, &
Biller (1996)

1

J

Friends who had personal
characteristics that would make
them likely to fit in at the school’s
CS department
Reasons (C1) for/ (C2) against
public transit

A

3

7

N

-

-

N

C1: r = .40 N =
24, C2: r = .28 N
= 24
-

Sense could fit
in and succeed
Sense could fit
in and succeed

N

-

-

N

-

-

Confidence;
attitude towards
using public
transporation

N

C1: r = .35 N =
35, C2: r = .12 N
= 32

-

-
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Wänke, Bohner, &
Jurkowitsch (1997)

1

J

Reasons to (C1, C3) drive/ (C2, C4)
not to drive BMW with (C1, C2)
actual or (C3, C4) anticipated
experience

A, N

1

10

BMW
Evaluation;
Mercedes
Evaluation;
Direct
preference
Masculinity;
private (C1)
versus public
(C2)

N

C1: r = .28 N =
38, C2: r = .47 N
= 25, C3: r = .45
N = 42, C4: r =
.44 N = 55

-

Weaver, Vandello, &
Bosson (2013)

2

J

Specific behaviors meeting cultural
ideals for real man

B

2

10

N

C1: r = .34, N =
38 C2: r = .13, N
= 35

-

Wehr (2010)*

1

J

A

1

Wehr (2010)

2

J

B

Weick & Guinote
(2008)

1a

J

Autobiographical situations which
were typical problem episodes or
exceptions
Autobiographical situations which
were typical problem episodes or
exceptions
Arguments in favor of sending
humans to Mars

5

Social Skill

N

-

-

1

5

N

r = .18 N = 46, r
= .14 N = 46

-

A

2

6

N

r = .39, N = 68

r = .09, N
= 68

Leisure events

A

2

10

N

r = .30, N = 41.5

J

Attributes on which men and
women differ

B

2

12

N

r = .24, N = 66

r = -.28, N
= 41.5
r = -.21, N
= 66

4

J

Arguments in favor of new
identification card

A

3

7

N

r = .10, N = 64

r = -.10, N
= 64

Winkielman,
Schwarz, & Belli
(1998)
Winkielman &
Schwarz (2001)

1

J

Events experienced when 5-7 or 810 years old

A

4

12

N

r = .34, N = 48

-

1

J

N

4

12

N

(C1) r = .19 N =
179, (C2) r = .03
N = 179

-

Woltin, Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin, Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)

1

J

Events experienced when 5-7 or 810 years old; (C1) pleasant
childhood difficult to remember /
(C2) unpleasant childhood difficult
to remember
Assertive

Coping
confidence,
serious
Attitude towards
sending humans
to Mars
Leisure time
satisfaction
Stereotypicality;
percentage
estimate
Attitude toward
new
identification
card
Judged
childhood
memory
Childhood
pleasantness

Weick & Guinote
(2008)
Weick & Guinote
(2008)

2

J

3

Weick & Guinote
(2008)

A

4

10

N

r = .32, N = 74

-

2

J

Creative

A

2

6

Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Creativity

C2

C1: r = .35, N =
44

Woltin, Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)

3

J

Creative

A

2

6

N

r = .43, N = 48

C2: r = .19, N =
41
r = .04, N
= 47

Self-rated
Creativity
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Woltin, Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin, Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin, Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Wood (2010)

4

J

Assertive

A

2

8

Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Extroversion
Self-rated
Creativity
Choice of snack

N

r = .17, N = 59

5

U

Extraversion/lack of extraversion

A

2

5

N

r = .38, N = 63

6

U

Creative

A

2

6

N

r = -.09, N = 75.5

5

J

N

2

8

Yahalom & Schul
(2013)
Yahalom & Schul
(2013)
Yahalom & Schul
(2013)
Yeager & Krosnick
(2002)

1

J

Big changes going on in life right
now
Assertive

N

r = .15, N = 240

N

4

10

Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Assertiveness
Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

r = .27, N = 43.3

2

J

Assertive

A

4

10

N

r = .40, N = 40

3

J

Assertive

A

4

10

N

r = .36, N = 59

1

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive

A

6

12

N

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

3

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

(C1, C2)
B, (C3,
C4) A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

(C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2, C4)
Unassertive

(C1, C2)
B, (C3,
C4) A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive

A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertiveness

N

2

D

A

6

12

Math interest

N

2

J

Well-known successful same-sex
role models
Activities could do with X1-100

C1: r = -.016 N =
674, C2: r = .07
N = 623
C1: r = .03 N =
404, C2: r = .07
N = 373
C1: r = .04 N =
1532, C2: r = -.02
N = 1579
C1: r = .003 N =
517, C2: r = -.02
N = 522, C3: r =
.04 N = 526, C4:
r = .04 N = 540
C1: r = .06 N =
772, C2: r = -.05
N = 727, C3: r =
.10 N = 817, C4:
r = -.05 N = 776
C1: r = -.01 N =
108, C2: r = -.04
N = 110
r = .19, N = 79

Yeager & Krosnick
(2010)

2

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive

A

3

Yeager & Krosnick
(2012)

3

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive

A

Yeager & Krosnick
(2012)

4

U

(C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2, C4)
Unassertive

Yeager & Krosnick
(2013)

5

U

Yeager & Krosnick
(2013)

6

Yoke (2009)
Zhao, Hoeffler, &
Dahl (2012)
Zhao, Hoeffler, &
Dahl (2012)
Zhao, Hoeffler, &
Dahl (2012)

A

1

8

N

r = .32, N = 43

3

J

Activities could do with X1-100

A

1

8

N

r = .28, N = 55

4

J

Activities could do with Z-500

A

1

8

Product
Evaluation
Product
Evaluation
product
evaluation

N

r = .38, N = 55

r = -.19, N
= 62
r = -.04, N
= 63
r = -.10, N
= 75.5
r = -.29, N
= 43.3
r = .02, N
= 40
r = -.17, N
= 59
-

-

r = -.07, N
= 41
r = -.01, N
= 58
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Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a position yields
less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects.
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency.
1
J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished
2
B=Before, A=After, N=None
3
N = None

128
Table B2. List of studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database – distal effect sizes.
Paper

Exp

Source1

Topic Retrieved

Difficulty
Question2

Many

DV

Misattribution3

XY Std

Alter & Balcetis
(2010)

3

J

Reasons NY (C1) vibrant and
exciting/ (C2) dirty and dangerous

N

2

10

N

C1: r = .32, N =
30, C2: r = .41, N
= 30

N

2

10

Subjective
Distance from
Princeton to
New York City
Book Ratings

Avnet (2005)

2

D

Times correct in trusting feelings:
(C1) pleasant or (C2) unpleasant

N

C1: r = .19 N =
26.5, C2: r = .56
N = 26.5

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

2

J

Times correct in trusting feelings for
(C1) pleasant or (C2) unpleasant

A

2

10

Attitude towards
reading

N

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

A

2

10

Ratio Bias

N

C1: r = .11 N =
26, C2: r = .48 N
= 26
r = ., N = 97

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)
Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

3
4

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .18 N = 37

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

5

J

A

2

10

N

C1: r = .31 N =
26, C2: r = .49 N
= 31

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

6

J

A

2

10

N

C1: r = .36 N =
42, C2: r = .05 N
= 49

Bartels & Urminsky
(2011)

3

J

Times correct in trusting feelings:
(C1, C2) low relevant or (C3, C4)
high relevance for (C1, C3) pleasant
or (C2, C4) unpleasant
Times correct in trusting feelings:
(C1, C2) no load or (C3, C4) load
for (C1, C3) pleasant or (C2, C4)
unpleasant
Reasons identity would remain
stable

Acceptance of
20% share of
pie in
Ultimatum
Game
Recommendatio
n of whether
friend should
meet their target
Evaluations of
nonfiction book

B

2

12

Discount factor

N

r = .32, N = 97

Bartels & Urminsky
(2011)
Beck (2004)

4

J

B

2

12

r = .28, N = 71

D

N

3

7

Discount factor;
impatience
Predicted
success

N

3

Reasons identity would remain
stable
(C1) Successful/ (C2) unsuccessful
metamemory judgments

N

Beck (2004)

4

D

Reasons would or would not be
successful

N

2

6

C1: r = .0 N = 26,
C2: r = .41 N =
26
r = .11, N = 51

Carter & Sanna
(2008)

2

J

(C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect selfpresentation strategies

B

Few

3

12

Valence of
metamemory
assessments
Subjective
Distance

N
N

C1: r = .48 N =
16, C2: r = .59 N
= 16

-
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Caruso et al. (2011)

1

U

Everyday purchases

B

2

6

Cheng (2005)

3

D

Good things about being an Asian
American

N

3

12

Crescioni (2012)

1

D

Stressors

B

3

12

Cutright, Bettman, &
Fitzsimons (2013)

1

J

Things in life over which have
complete control

N

2

10

Cutright, Bettman, &
Fitzsimons (2013)

3

J

Things in life over which have
complete control

N

2

10

Ehrlinger (2004)

9

D

B

3

12

Eibach, Libby, &
Gilovich (2003)
Etkin & Ratner
(2013)

4

J

B

3

12

4

J

Reasons might lose money with
investment
Things about you changed since
high school
(C1, C2) Similarities/ (C3, C4)
Differences in protein bars for (C1,
C3) temporally near or (C2, C4)
temporally far

N

2

10

Fuller, McIntyre, &
Oberleitner (2013)

1

J

Instances of (C1) success/ (C2)
failure

A

3

9

Gawronski (2003)

3

J

Counterarguments to (C1, C2) pro/
(C3, C4) con for (C1, C3) having
freedom or (C2, C4) not

N

2

7

Satisfaction
with personal
finances
Bicultural
Identity
Integration
Scale-Pilot
Version;
Distance Scale;
Conflict scale
Combined
persistence
(attempts and
time spent on
puzzle)
Attitude
favorability
towards brand
extension;
perceived
control
Likelihood of
considering
extension
Overconfidence

N

-

r = .09, N
= 51

N

r = .07, N = 108

-

N

r = .37, N = 38

-

N

r = .35, N = 59

-

N

r = .53, N = 46.5

r = .11, N
= 46.5

N

r = .33, N = 33

-

External world
change
Motivation to
pursue fitness
goal

N

r = .25, N = 80

-

N

-

Performance on
trivial pursuit;
comparative
ability
assessment;
performance
perception
Attitude
attribution

N

C1: r = .16 N =
37.75, C2: r = .17
N = 37.75, C3: r
= .28 N = 37.75,
C4: r = .12 N =
37.75
C1: r = .40 N =
20, C2: r = .33 N
= 21

C1: r = .11 N =
19.75, C2: r = .35
N = 19.75, r = .35

-

N

-

130
N = 19.75, r = .34
N = 19.75
C1: r = .32 N =
18, C2: r = .59 N
= 17
C1: r = .51 N =
21

C2: r = .40 N = 22

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen (2005)

1

J

(C1) Liked/ (C2) Disliked African
Americans

A

3

10

Implicit
prejudice

N

-

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen (2005)

2

J

A

3

10

Implicit
prejudice

N

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen (2005)

3

J

A

3

10

Implicit
stereotyping

N

C1: r = .34 N =
31

C2: r = .34 N = 32

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen (wp)

1

U

Disliked African Americans (C1)
response compatibility (C2)
stimulus compatibility
Women considered strong (C1)
response compatibility (C2)
stimulus compatibility
African American individuals whom
they particularly disliked

B

5

12

Implicit
Prejudice

C2

C1: r = .39, N =
24

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen (wp)

2

U

Strong women they particularly
disliked

B

5

12

Implicit
Stereotyping

C2

C1: r = .41, N =
22

Gershoff, Mukherjee,
& Mukhopadhyay
(2008)
Greifeneder et al.
(2011b)

3

J

Things liked about movie

A

3

8

False Consensus

N

r = .34, N = 103

C2: r = .28, N =
24
C2: r = .19, N =
24
-

1

J

A

2

4

Trusting
Behavior

N

C1: r = .29 N =
30

Greifeneder et al.
(2011b)

2

J

A

1

3

Trusting
behavior

N

C1: r = .34 N =
27.5

Haddock (2004)

2

J

A

1

6

Temporal bias

N

C2: r = .24, N =
43.5

IJzerman & Semin
(2010)
IJzerman & Semin
(2010)
IJzerman & Semin
(2010)
Janiszewski,
Lichtenstein, &
Belyavsky (2008)

2

J

Aspects of trust game seeming
unfair as senders (C1) low
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty
Aspects of trust game seeming
unfair as senders (C1) low
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty
Reasons how (C2) personally made
event happen/ (C1)other people and
external factors made event happen
Similarities

A

3

10

N

-

3

J

Similarities

N

3

10

N

-

4

J

Differences

N

3

10

N

-

3

J

Bike feature/place to use the bike;
(C1) intermediate offer, (C2)
premium offer, or (C3) standard
offer

A

1

3

Ambient
temperature
Ambient
temperature
Ambient
temperature
Transaction
commitment

N

C1: r = .17, N =
56

Keller & Bless (2005)

1

J

(C1) Stereotypic/(C2) nonstereotypic personal experiences

B

2

5, 6

Emotional
intelligence test
performance

N

C1: r = .27 N =
43, C2: r = .18 N
= 43

C2: r = .25, N =
30
C2: r = .13 N =
27.5
C1: r = .29, N =
43.5
r = .28, N
= 50
r = .25, N
= 70
r = .39, N
= 36
C2: r = .24 N =
63, C3: r
= .03 N =
55
-
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Kennedy (2008)

1

D

Reasons why academic event was
positive/negative in (C1) first or
(C2) 3rd person

B

3

12

Inevitability
rating
(Hindsight
Judgment)
Anticipated,
Expected
(Hindsight
Judgments)
Possible selves
Number of
transitivity
violations
Purchase
decision;
motivation
Exercise
intention

N

C1: r = -.12 N =
52

C2: r = .22 N = 52

Kennedy (2008)

2

D

Reasons about why performed in
low percentile (C1) first or (C2) 3rd
person

B

3

12

N

C1: r = .06 N =
26.5

C2: r = .10 N =
26.5

Lee (2005)
Lee, Amir, & Ariely
(2009)

1
3

J
J

Benefits or difficulties of work
Times correct in trusting feelings

A
N

2
2

6
10

N
N

r = .30 N = 79.5
r = .20, N = 101

r = .03, N
= 101

Ling (2009)

3

D

Instances of optimistic thinking

N

2

8

N

r = .27, N = 76.5

r = -.15, N
= 76.5

Ling (2009)

7

D

Instances of optimistic thinking

N

2

8

N

r = .26, N =
38.75; r = .43, N
= 38.75

8

Willingness-topay

N

r = .10, N =
48.50; r = .33, N
= 48.50

2

5

N

r = .19, N = 103

A

2

5

N

C1: r = .17 N =
36, C2: r = .39 N
= 39

-

Steps of planning; (C1) ease is bad
or (C2) ease is good

A

2

8

N

C1: r = .26 N =
60, C2: r = .16 N
= 58

-

Unfair aspects of negotiation
procedure
Number of low-priced products sold
at store
What another person would say
during conversation

B

2

4

N

r = .29, N = 51

A

2

5

N

r = .48, N = 100

r = -.31, N
= 51
-

A

4

15

Optimistic bias
(predicted
minus actual
completion
times); accuracy
Optimistic bias
(predicted
minus actual
completion
times); accuracy
Optimistic bias
(predicted
minus actual
completion
times); accuracy
Cooperative
Behavior
Store
favorability
Overall attitude
towards group

r = .18, N
= 38.75; r
= -.17, N
= 38.75
r = -.29, N
= 48.50; r
= .08, N =
48.50
-

Ling (2009)

8

D

Instances of optimistic thinking

N

2

Min & Arkes (2012)

1

J

Wedding planning steps

A

Min & Arkes (2012)

2

J

Class assignment planning steps;
(C1) pessimistic or (C2) optimistic

Min & Arkes (2012)

3

J

Müller et al. (2010)

1

J

Ofir et al. (2008)

1b

J

Park (2009)

1a

D

N

r = -.03, N = 104

-
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Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)

1

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

Prediction
accuracy

N

r = .10, N = 231

-

Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Redden & Galak
(2012)

2

J

N

2

10

r = .27, N = 85.5

J

N

2

10

N

r = .19, N = 134

r = -.03, N
= 85.5
-

5

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .11, N = 204

-

6

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .23, N = 52

-

8

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

J

Last times heard favorite song

N

2

6

r = .37, N =
116.67
r = .22, N =
200.67

-

2

Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Choice of
favorite song

N

4

Times correct in trusting feelings,
Times searching for info on Google
Times correct in trusting feelings

Sanna, Chang, &
Carter (2004)

3

J

Thoughts about (C1) outcome/ (C2)
alternative

B

2

10

N

3

J

Reasons for (C1) successful/ (C2)
unsuccessful task completion

B

5

15

Sharma et al. (2014)
Sharma et al. (2014)

2
2pilo
t

J
J

Times worse off financially
Times worse off financially,
Assertive

N
A

2
2

10
10

N
N

C1: r = .66 N =
20, C2: r = .69 N
= 20
C1: r = .51 N =
20, C2: r = .57 N
= 20
r = .28, N = 50
r = .32, N = 88.5

-

Sanna, Parks, Chang,
& Carter (2005)

Sharma et al. (2014)

4

J

Times worse off financially

N

2

10

N

r = 0, N = 96

-

Sharma et al. (2014)
Stephen & Pham
(2008)

4f
1

J
J

Times worse off financially
Times correct in trusting feelings

N
N

2
2

10
10

N
N

r = .06, N = 187
r = .31, N = 60

-

Stephen & Pham
(2008)

2

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .27, N = 47

-

Stephen & Pham
(2008)
Stephen & Pham
(2008)
Sussman & Alter
(2012)

3

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .36, N = 58

-

pilot

J

Times correct in trusting feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .36, N = 36

-

4b

J

Recently purchased items

A

3

10

Subjective
temporal
distance
Subjective
temporal
distance
Dishonesty rate
Self-rated
Financial wellbeing
Mean sentence
severity
Fairness
Offers in
Ultimatum
Game
Initial offers in
counteroffer
game
Offer size in
Dictator Game
Self-rated Trust
in feelings
Willingness-topay

N

r = .14, N = 254

-

N

N

-

r = .01, N
= 88.5
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Thorisdottir & Jost

1a

J

Instances in which they felt
threatened

N

3

12

Self-rated
Closedmindedness
(NFC scale)

N

-

r = -.04, N
= 48

Thorisdottir & Jost

1b

J

Instances in which they felt
threatened

N

3

12

N

-

r = -.33, N
= 50

Weaver, Vandello, &
Bosson (2013)
Wood (2010)

2

J

B

2

10

N

r = .32, N = 35

5

J

N

2

8

N

r = .15, N = 240

r = .03, N
= 38
-

Zauberman, Ratner,
& Kim (2009)

5

J

Specific behaviors meeting cultural
ideals for real man
Big changes going on in life right
now
(C1) Special/ (C2)non-special
experiences

Self-rated
Closedmindedness;
perceived threat
Imminent
payoff choice
Choice of snack

N

2

10

N

Zhao, Hoeffler, &
Dahl (2012)

4

J

A

1

8

Willingness-topay for
Keychain
Choice of
product over
Amazon gift
certificate;
product
evaluation

C1: r = .16 N =
112, r = .10 N =
112
r = .33, N = 55

Activities could do with Z-500

N

Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a position yields
less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects.
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency.
1
J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished
2
B=Before, A=After, N=None
3
N = None

-

r = -.06, N
= 58
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APPENDIX C: STANDARD PARADIGM MEDIATION MODERATOR ANALYSES
Table C.1.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for proximal standard
paradigm.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

.032
-.010

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

31

.098 (.024)

112

.118 (.020)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

68
75

.069 (.024)
.144 (.022)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

95
48

.095 (.023)
.146 (.029)

Attention

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators

.015 (.012)

^

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

-.024 (.015)

-.030

.003

.113 (.026)

.006

-.003

.100 (.029)
.109 (.026)

.023

-.014

.087 (.024)
.137 (.032)

-.036

.102 (.021)
Inference Moderators
*
-.032
^
-.010

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
.011 (.011)
-.009
-.016 (.013)

Year

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')

^

-.048

.008

-.004

-.002

-.006

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

78
65

.111 (.026)
.118 (.029)

-.005

.083 (.026)
.130 (.029)

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

40
103

.085 (.042)
.120 (.022)

-.006

.002 (.039)
.130 (.021)

Number of measures (M)

.020 (.019)

.017

.015 (.019)

-.019

.0002

Number of measures (Y)

-.011 (.017)

-.014

.020 (.018)

.025

.012

.105 (.023)

-.002

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

119

.100 (.022)

24

.159 (.037)

-.018

.104 (.041)

**

-.061

**

-.070

-.021

*

**
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1

Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2
Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.
3
The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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Table C.2.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal standard
paradigm.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

.019 (.026)

.024

-.027 (.049)

-.017

.045

.119

.169 (.096)

-.092

-.005

.228 (.114)
.170 (.091)

.134

-.005

.221 (.026)
.042 (.105)

.102

.072

-.087

-.094

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

15

.075 (.045)

16

.006 (.023)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

10
21

-.008 (.029)
.028 (.018)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

28
3

.018 (.014)
.036 (.105)

Attention

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators

.221 (.106)
Inference Moderators
-.15
-.041

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
-.028 (.038)
.038
-.027 (.077)

Year

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

26
5

.025 (.010)
-.028 (.030)

-.018

.207 (.074)
.143 (.105)

.054

.055

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

3
28

.030 (.107)
.018 (.013)

-.065

.063 (.108)
.219 (.026)

.014

-.051

Number of measures (M)

.014 (.039)

-.053

.035 (.062)

.096

.067

Number of measures (Y)

-.006 (.031)

-.019

.063 (.059)

.077

.074

.155 (.089)

-.067

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

19

.068 (.042)

12

.006 (.024)

.113

^

.014

.254 (.114)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1
Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors
are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
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2

Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the
maximum condition index was below 30.
3
The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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Appendix D
Computational Methods for Testing Robustness with respect to Heterogeneity and
Potential Bias Due to Measurement Error and Correlated Error
In this Appendix, we describe the computational method used to estimate bias due to
measurement error and correlated error.
Recently, Fritz, Kenny, & MacKinnon (2014, 2016) have detailed the opposing nature of
biases due to measurement error and those due to correlated error. Figure 7 extends the simple
mediation model depicted in Figure 2 to depict measurement error and correlated error.
Measurement error in M creates a negative bias in the OLS estimate of b and a positive bias in c'.
In contrast, correlated error in M and Y (usually assumed to be due to some unmeasured
confounding variable) creates a positive bias in the OLS estimate of b and a negative bias in c'.
Thus, the two biases "cancel" to some degree and the net bias depends on the exact levels of the
two sources of bias. This fact alone is somewhat reassuring for those who would like to believe
that the OLS estimates are relatively unbiased and close to the true values. However, we take a
more precise and comprehensive approach that adjusts the direct and indirect effects for these
biases using plausible levels of the two sources of bias for each observation in the triplets dataset
for the standard paradigm. This approach uses the results and recommendations of Fritz, Kenny,
and MacKinnon (2014, 2016), MacKinnon and Pirlott (2015), and Pearl (2014).
Equations 1 - 3 in the text defined the estimates of the traditional OLS mediation model.
In this appendix, we subscript them with "U" as follows, to indicate that they are unadjusted.
aU = rXM

(D.1)

bU = (rMY – rXY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)

(D.2)

c'U = (rXY – rMY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)

(D.3)

The formulae for estimates that are corrected for measurement error and correlated error
are as follows.
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a = rXMT = rXM (rMM).5,

(D.4)

where rMM is the reliability of M and is determined by the size of d in Figure 7.
b = (bU / a) - p ,

(D.5)

c' = c'U - (abU (1 - a) / a) + ap ,

(D.6)

a = (rMM – rXM2) / (1 - rXM2),

(D.7)

p = ef / [rMM (1 - rXMT2)],

(D.8)

and

where

and the variances of M and C are assumed to be 1. These formulae and assumptions closely
follows Fritz at al. (2014; (D.4) is from their equation (4), (D.5) is from (13), (D.6) is from (14),
(D.7) is from (5) , and (D.8) is from (12) plus (4) and the assumption that SM2 = SC2 = 1). Fritz at
al. (2016) extended their earlier work by addressing the effects of measurement error in Y (i.e.,
rYY < 1) and by providing explicit formulae for standardized regression coefficients (which we
necessarily use because our data are limited to the three correlations). The new formula for b is
equivalent to the one described in the text, given the reasonable assumption that rYY = rMM (which
is set to .8 in our analyses, see below). The new formula for c' is equivalent to the one used in
the text only when rYY = 1 (which is unlikely). However, for our data, estimates of c' based on
rYY = 1 and estimates based on rYY = .8 are essentially the same (r = .9987, with means equal to
.079 and .084, respectively). We ignore rYY in the text for clarity of exposition, and the fact that
its effects are relatively small compared to those of measurement error (i.e., rMM < 1) and
correlated error (i.e., e = f > 0).
To adjust the OLS estimates of indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects we chose plausible
values of error parameters. In particular, we used rMM = .8 for measurement error because this is

140
the traditional level of minimum reliability used in many research areas. Choosing plausible
values for e and f was based on the literature on response style (which is the most natural source
of unmeasured confounding variables for ease-or-retrieval experiments). in a large scale study
the effects of response style, Baumgartner & Steenkamp (2001; see also Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
& Podsakoff, 2012) estimate inflation for rMY to be about 58%. Assuming e = f = .34 yields
inflation close to this level. Inflation for rMY was estimated based on Pearl's (2014) formula for
rMY = bMY = d(b + ef + ac'), which yields inflation equal to [(b + ef + ac') / (b + ac')] - 1. We also
note that this is close to the moderate level of correlated error used by Fritz et al. in their
simulations (which were .19, .39, and .59 in the 2014 analyses and .32 in the 2016 analyses).
This level of correlated error is also consistent with a sensitivity analysis that we conducted for
the overall average values of rXY, rXM, and rMY in our data, a reasonable range of measurement
error (i.e., low and high reliability for M, .6 and .8 respectively), and a reasonable estimate of
correlated error (i.e., e = f = .19, .34, and .39). The results are provided in Table D.1.
The sensitivity analysis revealed that, for the standard paradigm, the expected bias for
correlations near the average values for the standard paradigm is such that b and a x b are
maximally underestimated when reliability and correlated error are low (i.e., rMM = .6 and e = f
=.19) and maximally overestimated when reliability and correlated error are high (i.e., rMM = .8
and e = f = .39). For the moderated paradigm, the expected bias for correlations near the average
values is such that c' (i.e., the presumed causal path when the effect is moderated) is not much
affected and is always negative, and b and a x b are strongly reduced except when correlated
error is low (i.e., e = f =.19).
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Table D.1.
Sensitivity Analysis for estimated mediation coefficients corrected measurement error and correlated error.
None
1.000

Low
.800

Moderated
Low
Low
.800
.800

High
.600

High
.600

High
.600

Low
.190

Med.
.340

High
.390

Low
.190

Med.
.340

High
.390

.248
.405
.297

High
Low
Med. High
None
.390
.190
.340
.390
.000
Raw Correlations and Bias Correction Factors
.248
.248
.248
.248
-.157
.405
.405
.405
.405
.288
.297
.297
.297
.297
.058

-.157
.288
.058

-.157
.288
.058

-.157
.288
.058

-.157
.288
.058

-.157
.288
.058

-.157
.288
.058

.453
.761
.043
.057

.453
.761
.138
.182

.453
.761
.182
.239

.288
1.000
.000
.000

.322
.782
.039
.050

.322
.782
.126
.161

.322
.782
.166
.212

.372
.564
.039
.070

.372
.564
.126
.224

.372
.564
.166
.294

.235
.235
.235
.235

.235
.309
.192
.252

.235
.309
.097
.127

.235
.309
.053
.070

.113
.113
.113
.113

.113
.144
.073
.094

.113
.144
-.014
-.017

.113
.144
-.053
-.068

.113
.200
.073
.130

.113
.200
-.014
-.024

.113
.200
-.053
-.095

12. a x b (uncorrected)
13. a x b (corrected)

.095
.095

.095
.093

.095
.047

.095
.026

.032
.032

.032
.025

.032
-.005

.032
-.018

.032
.037

.032
-.007

.032
-.027

14. c' (uncorrected)
15. c' (corrected)

.153
.153

.153
.160

.153
.206

.153
.227

-.189
-.189

-.189
-.180

-.189
-.151

-.189
-.137

-.189
-.188

-.189
-.144

-.189
-.123

16. Bias in b
17. Bias in a x b
18. Bias in c'

.000
.000
.000

-.017
-.019
.008

.108
.038
-.049

.165
.064
-.075

.000
.000
.000

.019
.002
-.006

.130
.038
-.042

.181
.054
-.058

-.017
-.016
.006

.137
.041
-.051

.207
.068
-.077

Measurement Error (ME)
rMM

None
1.000

Low
.800

Low
.800

Correlated Error (CE)
e=f

None
.000

Low
.190

Med.
.340

.248
.405
.297

.248
.405
.297

.405
1.000
.000
.000

8. b (uncorrected)
9. b (corrected, ME only)
10. b (corrected, CE only)
11. b (corrected)

1. rXY
2. rXM
3. rMY
4. rXM (a)
T

5. a
6. p (no ME)
7. p (w/ ME)

Standard
Low
.800

High
.600

.523
.522
.043
.083

High
.600

High
.600

.523
.523
.522
.522
.138
.182
.265
.349
Estimates of b
.235
.235
.235
.451
.451
.451
.192
.097
.053
.368
.186
.102
Estimates of a x b (indirect effect)
.095
.095
.095
.145
.073
.040
Estimates of c' (direct effect)
.153
.153
.153
.122
.193
.226
Estimates of bias
-.133
.049
.133
-.097
-.002
.042
.069
-.026 -.070

